

CONFIDENTIAL—NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

ARAB INDEPENDENCE AND UNITY.

A NOTE

**ON THE ARAB CAUSE WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO PALESTINE
AND SUGGESTIONS FOR A PERMANENT SETTLEMENT
TO WHICH ARE ATTACHED TEXTS OF ALL
THE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS.**

BY

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MY DEAR MR. CASEY,

After our conversation about the future of the Arab States I decided to follow your advice and write a memorandum on the subject showing my personal interpretation of the problems facing us and putting forward my suggestions for their solution. The attached note has been prepared by me in my personal capacity, and although I know that several of my colleagues and other Iraqi leaders have similar views I do not wish it to be regarded in any way as a statement of the Iraq Government's policy.

As you are very busy these days and cannot be expected to read up the details of pledges and promises made twenty four years ago, and all the discussions that have taken place since, I have tried to give as briefly as possible a summary of what has happened since the end of the last War. While my reading of the past differences between the Arabs and the British and the French is perhaps not unnaturally coloured, I have for the purpose of this note treated the subject as objectively as I can.

In view of the recent activities of Zionist organisations in England and America I feel that some declaration should be made by Great Britain and the United States of America regarding the future of the Arab territories which formerly formed part of the Ottoman Empire. The Palestine Post on November 2nd 1942 gave prominence to a report of a public demonstration held in London on November 1st under the auspices of the Zionist Federation. Messages of sympathy were sent by a number of prominent persons who are entitled to their own views, but we were surprised that two serving Secretaries of State, sent messages of sympathy. The Zionist Federation has always declared that by a National Home in Palestine they mean an independent Jewish State and sympathy with Zionism implies support of their policy of creating such a State in Palestine, although the British Government has frequently and categorically declared that that is not her policy.

In Iraq we are not allowing news of this kind to be published, as we do not want Arab feeling to be inflamed against the Jews and the British. But, if the Zionists and their sympathisers are allowed to continue their propaganda, it will be very difficult for Arab leaders to restrain Arab journalists and politicians from initiating counter propaganda in the Arab States. Unfortunately, in England and America friends of the Arab cause have always experienced great difficulty in securing publicity for their views and now in war time the position is worse owing to the shortage of newspaper space. Moreover the terrible persecution which the Jews are suffering in Germany, Italy and occupied Europe naturally evokes sympathy for Jews generally, and anybody who writes or speaks against Zionism is in danger of being regarded as condoning these persecutions.

Some time ago there was an agitation by the Zionists to create a Jewish Army in Palestine and elsewhere to fight against the Axis. The British Government refused to be persuaded. But taking advantage of the recent disclosures of Jewish massacres in Poland and Germany, the Zionists are again pressing for a Jewish Army and have succeeded in enlisting very strong support for it in the United States.

A Jewish Army unconnected with Palestine is no concern of the Arabs in Palestine or of the Arab States. But will the Zionists be content with a Jewish Army divorced from the Jewish National Home or Zion (Palestine)? If there is any intention of recruiting such an Army in Palestine or using it in Palestine or neighbouring Arab countries, the Arabs are bound to consider that the intention is to force the Allied Nations to accept the Zionist demand for a Jewish State and that this army's ultimate purpose will be to fight the Arabs for the possession of Palestine. As you know some Jews are boasting that already in Palestine they have the nucleus of an Army with stores of rifles, machine guns and grenades. I am inclined to disbelieve this, but if such claims continue to be made they will cause further alarm to the Arabs there.

Dr. Chaim Weizmann, the Zionist leader, in an article in *Foreign Affairs*, an American quarterly, for January 1942, again urges the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine and writes as if it is bound to be established after this War. From 1919 to 1922 he expressed the same views, then, when he realised the strength of Arab opposition to these claims he modified them. Now he has revived them. I feel that if the United Nations made a definite pronouncement *now*, to the effect that they will not support the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine but adhere to the policy laid down in the White Paper of 1939 the Zionists would make protests of course, but would accept the decision as final. They believe that it is possible in the course of a great struggle such as the present War to exact promises which would not be made in time of peace. So their extreme claims should be refused categorically now. At the same time, if you agree with my suggestion, it would be possible for the United Nations to guarantee the future of the Jewish National Home as it exists at present in Palestine with all the possibilities of its normal semi-autonomous development within the fabric of a greater Syria and an Arab League.

I invite your consideration of these matters as I am of opinion that, unless both the Zionists and their British and American sympathisers cease their propaganda during the war, the Arabs will start their own propaganda and that the Axis Powers will seize the opportunity, so presented, to create bad blood between Great Britain and the Arabs of the Near and Middle East.

Your Sincerely
(*Sd.*) NURI as-SA'ID.

THE RT. HON. R. G. CASEY, D.S.O., M.C.,
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Cairo.

Note on Arab Independence and Unity

With

PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO PALESTINE AND SUGGESTIONS FOR A FINAL SETTLEMENT.

The Arab peoples can be divided into two main groups, (1) those living in Africa and (2) those living in Syria, in Palestine, in Iraq and in the Arabian peninsula.

Although in the second group the Arabs of the Arabian peninsula can be generally distinguished from those of Syria, Iraq, Palestine and Trans-Jordan yet linguistically, culturally, economically the Arabs of those former Ottoman provinces are one people. In spite of the fact that during the past twenty years they have been divided into several different States and that diverse laws have been introduced into these States, yet, owing to the improvement in communications and education, they are culturally as close together as they have been for centuries. (This sameness particularly applies to the Ottoman territories lying on the South Eastern coast of the Mediterranean. Syria, formed one compact Arab area of which Palestine, the Lebanon and Trans-Jordan were parts not distinguishable from each other nor from the present truncated State of Syria). These regions including Iraq were all part of the territories of the Ottoman Empire; no international boundaries divided them, the form of administration was the same, and the same law applied. The habits and customs of the inhabitants in these areas were the same whether they were Muslim or Christian as indeed were their food and their general outlook.

Although in Syria and Palestine considerable numbers of Christians are to be found they are mainly Arab in origin and their customs, their language, their way of life are much the same as those of their Muslim neighbours. In the past the Christian denominations have frequently been more hostile towards each other than towards the Muslims who treated all denominations alike.

The only Christian community which had a special position was that of the Maronites. In 1846 following disturbances between the Maronites and the Druzes of the Lebanon, this province was "placed under a privileged régime based on a large measure of autonomy which allowed the Maronities to have their own system of local government under a Christian Governor." This special form of administration rested on an International Guarantee.

As under the old Ottoman Empire there existed various "Millets" with special rights, the idea of semi-autonomous communities within the State is familiar to all Arabs of the Succession States and generally accepted as a fair and sensible policy. This privileged régime of the Maronites deserves careful study as it can be the model for semi autonomous Jewish provinces in Palestine, as will be explained later.

These Arabs of the Near and the Middle East, have for nearly a century, been struggling to secure their natural right to independence so that they may be able to unite; to recreate their ancient glory, and to progress in the path of civilization in freedom and peace. But, so far, political factors, external rather than internal, have obstructed their way and stood between them and their legitimate goal.

When the Arabs lost their independence several centuries ago, some of their countries fell to the Ottoman Empire and other were later seized by European countries and treated as colonies. Yet all this did not destroy the idea of independence in the Arab mind. Although Arab aspirations were suppressed for many years the desire for independence eventually revived, stronger and mightier than ever.

In the Ottoman Empire Arabs, as Muslims, were regarded as partners of the Turks. They shared with the Turks both rights and responsibilities without any racial distinction; the higher appointments in the State, whether military or civil, were open to the Arabs; they were represented in both the upper and the lower houses of the Ottoman Parliament. Many Arabs became Prime Ministers, Shaikhs al Islam, Generals and Walis, and Arabs were always to be found in all ranks of the State services.

When the decline of the Ottoman Empire began and the Party of Union and Progress started the Pan-Turkish Movement, the Arabs preferred to separate from that Empire; they launched a campaign for the defence of their rights, thereby paving the way for the independence of their countries.

At the beginning of the first Great War in 1914 the Arabs realised that a gloomy future awaited them owing to the sinister behaviour of the Party of Union and Progress which had thrown itself into the arms of the Germans and joined them in the war against the Allies. So King Hussein bin 'Ali (who was then the Sherif and Prince of Mecca) approached Great Britain who definitely pledged herself to secure for the Arabs their independence. Relying on those promises, King Hussein proclaimed in 1916 the separation of the Arabs from the Ottoman Empire and joined the Allies who were then passing through the most critical and dangerous stage of the War. The Arabs in all their countries welcomed the step taken by King Hussein and supported him in the hope that they would find in the pledges of the Allies the realization of their national aspirations. In consequence Arabs in Turkish territory were subjected to indescribable persecution and atrocities. But they fought the Turks on the side of the Allies and shared in the conquest of Palestine and Syria.

In spite of the doubts raised in their minds when the Turks made public the terms of the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement and when the Balfour Declaration was published, the Arabs continued to trust in the repeated pledges given by Great Britain to King Hussein, and to the Arabs of Syria and Iraq generally in various Proclamations, that "the future government of these territories should be based on the principle of the consent of the governed." This confidence

became a certainty in Arab minds when in his famous Fourteen Points President Wilson laid down that:—"The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be secured a sure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development."

But the Arabs were gravely disappointed after the war which ended with victory for the Allies with whom they had joined and with whom they had fought relying on their pledges to secure Arab independence. At the Peace Conference the Arabs realized that their victorious Allies had gone back on their promises. In fact the treatment which the Arabs received from their Allies was worse than that accorded to the vanquished who were not placed under any form of tutelage. The Allies divided the Arab territory amongst themselves according to secret treaties, granting themselves Mandates over these regions, in spite of the strong protests of all Arab leaders. These Mandates were harder for the Arabs to bear than the old Ottoman rule. The Mandatory System broke up the Arab territories into a number of separate administrations and was an arrangement which, if persisted in, would destroy Arab unity for ever. Iraq was placed under Great Britain as was Southern Syria, and Northern Syria was handed over to France. Only the Arab States of the Arabian peninsula were allowed complete independence.

During the last twenty years the Arabs have tried in every way to attract the attention of the civilized world to the wrong that has been done to them; they have constantly endeavoured to persuade world opinion of the justice of their cause and have struggled incessantly to obtain their independence. This mandatory system adopted by their Allies of the last Great War was obnoxious to the freedom loving Arabs who resent any form of tutelage. It has been the cause of all the disturbances, rebellions, boycotts and ill-will which have existed in these Arab countries and which still threaten their peace.

IRAQ

Iraq had been a mandated territory till 1932, when, by the exertions of her own people and aided by the British Government she obtained her independence and was admitted to the League of Nations in the same year. Ever since her independence, Iraq has been chiefly interested in her own affairs, following the path of development and advancement which can be seen in all the fields of her activities. She is bound to Great Britain by the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930 under the terms of which both States cooperate with complete understanding to their mutual benefit.

Iraq is not merely a neighbour of other Arab countries, she is closely connected to them by the strongest linguistic, racial, religious, cultural, economical and other ties. In addition, Iraq, shares with her neighbouring Arab countries the ideal of Arab Unity which it is hoped will be ultimately realised. Without such Union the Arabs will never be able to have their proper place in the world and regain their past glory of which they are so rightly proud.

Iraqis believe that such an Arab Union can only be effected by securing true independence for all Arab countries which, in the course of time, will make their choice as to the nature of the union which suits them best and fully guarantees their interests. These considerations have made Iraqis always responsive to happenings in the neighbouring sister Arab Countries and take an intense interest in them. Whatever happens in Syria or Palestine has some repercussion in Iraq. Although for centuries the Jews enjoyed complete liberty in Iraq and lived on excellent terms with their Muslim neighbours yet violent anti-Jewish feeling has been aroused by the events in Palestine. This hostility has been fanned by German Radio propaganda. As a result in 1941 when an interregnum existed in Iraq and the force of law and order were out of hand, the mbr looted the peaceful non-Zionist Jews of Baghdad and murdered a number of them. For this reason responsible statesmen in the Arab States, where large Jewish communities are residing, are always apprehensive of the effect in their own countries of what happens in Palestine. This also applies to all that occurs in the non-independent Arab regions.

NORTHERN SYRIA: (*The present mandated territories of Syria and the Lebanon*).

This was the most advanced of all the Arab provinces. The Syrians were the first to begin the Arab National movement for independence. American and French Universities and schools have been propagating learning and ideas of freedom among Arabs in Syria for over eighty years. In consequence Syria not only has a very numerous highly educated and cultured class of lawyers, doctors and Arts graduates but has a population with a highly developed political spirit.

In spite of the fact that Syria and the Lebanon are not less civilized than many European countries, the unsound mandatory system which has been imposed upon them has impoverished them and created dissension among their peoples, leading to frequent disturbances and disorder. The Syrian Arabs have seized every opportunity to win true independence and even sacrificed their desire for unity in order to obtain it. They made agreements with the French for their country to be divided into two States—the Lebanon and Syria. Unfortunately, they have been informed by a recent official announcement that, after about twenty five years of waiting for freedom, their countries are still to remain part of the French Empire. At the time of this declaration the French were lying under the yoke of Nazism and their governments, both central and colonial were supporting the Nazis whole-heartedly. The Arabs cannot believe that this decision will be upheld by the United Nations.

SOUTHERN SYRIA:—*now divided into two mandated territories as Palestine and Transjordan.*

The rivalry of Great Britain and France has separated these two countries, which are British mandated territories, from Syria of which they form an integral part. Transjordan enjoys a form of

autonomy under the rule of H.R.H. Prince Abdullah, Son of King Hussein, but is as anxious to obtain full independence as any of the other Arab Countries.

Of all the various problems facing the Arab countries that of Palestine is the most difficult and calls for most serious attention, because the policy hitherto followed has resulted in obvious injustice to its original inhabitants, the Arabs, who still constitute two thirds of the population. The Arabs of Palestine want to live independent in their own country; but the Zionist policy aims at wresting the land from the hands of its legitimate owners in order to transform it into a Jewish State. The Arabs do not hate the Jews, but they abhor the Zionist policy which aims at the annexation of their country. The Zionist Movement is backed by unlimited funds, powerful institutions and political parties, as well as by distinguished personalities of great influence in Great Britain and America, while the Arabs of Palestine can only rely on the justice of their cause and their own exertions. Although the Arabs of Palestine have the moral support of Arabs in all neighbouring countries these countries, have been powerless to help them, materially or militarily, owing to their alliances, in force or contemplated, with Great Britain or France. Moreover the Arab States want a peaceful settlement by agreement not by force.

The Arabs from the very beginning believed that the pledges that Great Britain gave to the late King Hussein (both when he was Sherif of Mecca and later when he was King of the Hejaz) included Palestine, Trans-Jordan and most of Syria. The declaration stated:

“That subject to certain modifications (which excluded Mersin, Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the West of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo) Great Britain is prepared to recognise and uphold the independence of the Arabs in all the regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the Sherif of Mecca.”

The British Government has never seriously challenged the Arab contention that Palestine was included in this pledge conveyed through Sir Henry MacMahon in 1915. (The full text of the correspondence is attached to this note).

The Balfour Declaration was made subsequent to this definite pledge and when its contents alarmed the Arabs, the British Government sent a special envoy, Commander Hogarth, to set the doubts of King Hussein at rest. King Hussein was assured that “Jewish settlement in Palestine would only be allowed in so far as would be consistent with the political and economic freedom of the Arab population.”

While the terms of the Palestine Mandate give special rights to the Jewish Agency and Jewish settlers in Palestine, it nowhere lays down that the Jews are to have a Jewish State in Palestine. (The Arabs, of course, have never accepted the Mandate as legal or binding on them and in the Mandate they are not even mentioned by name). In successive Statements of Policy, published as White Papers, H.M.G. has in 1922, 1930 and 1939, declared that “it is not part of British policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State.”

When Great Britain accepted the mandate for Palestine her first concern was to facilitate the creation of a Jewish National Home by assisting the Jewish Agency and other Jews to purchase land and by arranging the peaceful transfer of the Arab cultivators of such land. She also endeavoured to secure Arab goodwill for the Jewish National Home. The Mandatory was also occupied in establishing efficient administration and essential public services. So, for many years she made no serious effort to carry out the duty imposed upon her of assisting the inhabitants of Palestine to advance towards self-government. Unfortunately, when she eventually did consider how best to execute this part of her task, Arab fears of ultimate Jewish dominance and hostility to the Mandate had become so intense that it was impossible to secure their cooperation in any proposed legislative or other assembly which might have paved the way for self-government.

In 1937 Mr. Ormsby Gore then Secretary of State for the Colonies told the Permanent Mandate Commission in the clearest possible terms "that in the absence of a radical change in the political relations it would not be possible to carry on (—the government of Palestine) except by methods of continuous military repression. The fact was that in Palestine the vast majority of the population was hostile to the Mandatory Power and to the Mandate. The loyalty of the Arabs was not directed toward Great Britain, the Mandatory Power, but to the Arab race and the Arab ideal." At this meeting the Secretary of State reiterated this view "The Mandatory told the Mandates Commission—as it would tell the Council later—that they were convinced of the necessity of political changes", and again "It was his definite opinion that once the Arabs of Palestine (fired as they were with political hostility both to the Mandatory Power and to the Jews) were given self-government it would be to their interest to maintain security".

As a result H.M.G. recommended the partition of Palestine into three States—a Jewish State, an Arab State and a British Mandated area.

Upon careful examination by a special Boundary Commission the partition of Palestine into separate States was found to be impracticable. But this Commission did not examine the possibility of creating a Jewish enclave or enclaves, with special rights on the Maronite model, inside a Palestinian State or a greater Arab State which would include Syria and Trans-Jordan. The creation of two or more completely independent States out of the small territories of Palestine would have involved the creation of complex artificial boundaries with numerous pockets of Jews in the Arab State and *vice versa*, it would have meant the creation of at least one international corridor and possibly more. But if all Palestine were included in one Syrian State the boundaries of the Jewish enclaves would be administrative boundaries only. The Jewish areas might consist of a number of qadhas or even nahiyas in which the Jews would enjoy special rights; alternatively, by arrangement with all parties, a definite consolidated area could be assigned to the Jews for semi-autonomous administration and Arabs settled within it would have to accept to live under the special régime or be found land elsewhere.

However, the partition of Palestine into two independent States and a Mandated area, which had pleased nobody, was declared impossible and the final policy of Great Britain was made public in 1939 after the Palestine Conference had broken down.

In the latest White Paper of 1939 H.M.G. declared that:

- “(1) The objective of His Majesty’s Government is the establishment within ten years of an independent Palestine State in treaty relations with Great Britain....
- (2) The independent State should be one in which Arabs and Jews share in government in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests of each community are safeguarded.”

The White Paper of 1939, in effect, limited the Jewish National Home in Palestine to the Jewish communities then resident in Palestine plus 75,000 Jews who were to be allowed to settle in Palestine during the five years 1939—44. This meant that the Jews in Palestine would in 1944 constitute about a third of the population and that they would remain a permanent minority. H.M.G. therefore considered that by 1944 her pledge in the Balfour Declaration would have been fulfilled and a Jewish National Home established in Palestine. All that remained was to establish self-government in Palestine in such a way as would best safeguard the rights of the Jews who had settled in Palestine under the terms of the Balfour Declaration. The detailed proposals put forward by H.M.G. to reach this objective do not affect the underlying basis of the Statement of Policy:—That Palestine had to be given self-government as soon as possible and that the Jews should be a permanent minority in this new State.

The Conference which met in London for the consideration of the Palestine question in 1939 was the first occasion on which the Arab States were recognised by H.M.G. as being mutually interested in the settlement of the Palestine problem. The Conference included delegates representing Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yaman, Tran-Jordan and Iraq who were invited because their States were interested in the future of Palestine, it being an Arab territory, and its administration and future development a matter of common concern to all Arabs. In Arabs eyes this invitation marked a return by Great Britain to the spirit of her old pledges to King Hussein which regarded all Arabs in the old Ottoman Empire as one community united by one ideal. This is my first justification for raising these issues and making my suggestions at this time.

It has to be admitted that conditions in all these Arab countries have remained unsettled ever since the end of the last Great War. Numerous rebellions have broken out causing much bloodshed and devastation in many parts of these Arab lands. Apart from this, the most law-abiding inhabitants of these countries have always been the victims of worry and anxiety about their own future and that of their compatriots during all these long years. In Palestine and

Syria even the non-rebellious Arabs feel that they have not been allowed to develop their full civil and political rights. They have had no confidence in the ability of the Mandatory régime to provide a permanent peaceful form of government. They have had to live in territory too often subject to disorder to enable them to consider the future and prepare for it.

As soon as the present war broke out the axis powers did not lose a moment in looking for weak points in the Allied position in the Arab countries and promptly exploited any weaknesses they were able to discover. Elements of disorder and anarchy in all Arab countries were actively and unscrupulously supported with the result that both the Arabs and the United Nations suffered severely

In spite of previous disillusionments the Arabs have welcomed the Atlantic Charter with satisfaction because they consider it a guarantee for the realization of their national aspirations and for their future union in the way they choose of their own free will. We feel that the British Government regards the Arab claims with sympathy and that she is ready to solve the problems of the Arab countries in the same satisfactory manner as she solved those of Iraq. If she succeeds in putting these sympathetic intentions into effect the present chaotic state of the Arab countries will come to an end to the benefit of the Arabs themselves. We realize that the British Government has not a free hand in dealing with these problems, because her action is subject to the concurrence of her Allies. But now that the U.S.A. are co-operating so fully with Great Britain the hands of the latter are freer and we feel that it will be possible for her to reconsider her whole policy towards all Arabs.

All Arabs and particularly those of the Near and Middle East have deep down in their hearts the feeling that they are "members one of another." Their 'nationalism' springs from the Muslim feeling of brotherhood enjoined on them by the Prophet Muhammad in his last public speech. It differs therefore from a great deal of European nationalism and patriotism. Although Arabs are naturally attached to their native land their nationalism is not confined by boundaries. It is an aspiration to restore the great tolerant civilisation of the early Caliphate.

We therefore believe that any policy which satisfies the legitimate political rights and aspirations of the Arabs will restore peace to the Arab countries, and that such peace and contentment will be of invaluable service in promoting the interests of the United Nations in this grave period of war. Moreover, such a policy will put an end to the Axis intrigues in the Arab countries and stop the flood of Axis propaganda which finds there a most fertile soil for sowing its evil seeds owing to the discontent of the Arabs with their present situation and their anxiety about their future.

The events of the past few years have revealed the weakness of very small States. It is generally assumed that after the war the Peace Settlement will endeavour to group the smaller States together in some form of regional leagues or alliances which can be sufficiently powerful to protect all the members from aggression. While I realise

that many years must elapse before the Arab States can stand completely alone, yet, even their allies among the Great Powers will probably demand that they make a greater contribution to their own defence services. Therefore the old idea of creating an independent Palestine and an independent Lebanon and Syria must be abandoned and a new solution considered.

Great Britain and France have repeatedly declared that they agree to the future independence of each of these parts of historical Syria. If independence is admitted to be the right of the people living in these areas they must *ipso facto* have the right to coalesce in a unitary State or join together in a league or confederation. If experience has proved that very small States cannot adequately defend themselves and that they constitute a danger to their neighbours and to the peace of the world, then union or federation can justly be imposed on them if these separate States really form one community, linguistically, culturally and economically.

Paragraph Four of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations reads as follows:—

“Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development when their existence as independent Nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to start alone..”

Doubts have been expressed at various times as to whether Palestine came within the ambit of this paragraph. But Mr. Malcolm MacDonald told the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations in 1939 that “the Arabs of Palestine could not be regarded as so utterly different from the Arabs of Iraq or Syria that rights which clearly belonged to the latter under paragraph four should be completely denied to their fellow Arabs in Palestine.”

This statement goes to the root of the whole problem. The Arab contention is that all the Muslims, Christians, Jews and Druzes who occupy the Lebanon, Syria, Trans-Jordan and Palestine are one community not differing very greatly from the inhabitants of Iraq. In 1918 this community was better educated than the Iraqis and more acquainted with and tolerant of modern, centralised, bureaucratic administration.

The Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations decided in June 1939 that the proposal of H.M.G. to set up in Palestine an Arab State in which the Jews would form a minority was contrary to the interpretation which had always been placed upon the Palestine Mandate. In commenting on this decision H.M.G. pointed out that it had been found impracticable to form both an independent Arab State and an independent Jewish State in Palestine but that “one of the possibilities which the Mandatory Powers had in view is the establishment of a federal constitution.”

Now Palestine is a very small territory with a population of less than 2 million souls. To create a federal constitution for such a small country would be difficult and expensive. But if Palestine reverts

to its proper place as part of the historical Syria it should be possible to create for Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-Jordan either a unitary State or a federal constitution which would work efficiently. If the Palestinian Arabs could be reunited with the Arabs of Syria and Trans-Jordan they would not be so apprehensive of Jewish expansion and the Jewish communities now in Palestine would feel safer and more settled. They could be allowed a considerable degree of local autonomy under some form of international guarantee if that is considered necessary.

In the very protracted and frank discussions which took place between Mr. Malcolm MacDonald and the Permanent Mandates Commission in June 1939 the point was raised again and again that there must be a spirit of evolution in the consideration of specific pledges and promises. While in no way denying the validity of the various pledges and promises given by H.M.G. to various communities, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald felt that these pledges and promises had to be reinterpreted from time to time in the light of the development both political and economic that had occurred in Palestine since the pledges were first given. Such reconsideration is indeed specifically provided for in Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations which lays down that: "The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world." This is another justification for recommending the re-examination of the whole position of the Arab States of the Near and Middle East.

In Iraq whose population in 1918 was more backward politically and educationally than that of Syria and Palestine it has been shown that an independent nature state can function efficiently with the minimum of advice and support from its Ally. In Saudi-Arabia H.M. Ibn Saud has shown that an Arab Ruler can maintain peace and order over nomad Bedouins occupying vast stretches of desert and over settled Arabs in towns and oases and considerably develop their resources. The discovery of oil in Arab countries has given them economic resources and revenues not hitherto available. Iraq needs an outlet to the Mediterranean for its oil and other products. Palestine which is being rapidly industrialised needs markets for its products and oil fuel for its factories. These are facts which have to be taken into account and which justify a re-examination of the pledges given by the British Government some of which were embodied in the Mandates of the League of Nations. These present factors call for a new policy altogether which will settle permanently the future of the inhabitants of the Near and Middle East.

My proposals which follow are based on the close relations which already exist between Iraq and all the Arabs of historic Syria. The States of the Arabian peninsula although so near to us in language, custom and religion have a different economy. Egypt has a larger population than the Succession States and has her own problems in the Sudan and elsewhere. I have therefore assumed that these States will not at first be inclined to join an Arab Federation or League, though if such a union succeeded between Iraq and Syria there

is every likelihood that they would in time wish to join it. But from the very beginning I anticipate that such a League, even if limited to Iraq and Syria, would facilitate joint consultation between and action by all Arab States whether within the League or not. Many of our problems are the same; we are all part of one civilisation: we generally think along the same lines and we are all animated by the same ideals of freedom of conscience, liberty of speech, equality before the law and the basic brotherhood of mankind.

CONCLUSION:

In my view the only fair solution, and indeed the only hope of securing permanent peace, contentment and progress in these Arab areas is for the United Nations to declare *now* :—

- (1) That Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-Jordan shall be reunited into one State.
- (2) That the form of government of this State, whether monarchical or republican whether unitary or federal, shall be decided by the peoples of this State themselves.
- (3) That there shall be created an Arab League to which Iraq and Syria will adhere at once and which can be joined by the other Arab States at will.
- (4) That this Arab League shall have a permanent Council nominated by the member States, and presided over by one of the rulers of the States who shall be chosen in a manner acceptable to the States concerned.
- (5) The Arab League Council shall be responsible for the following :—
 - (a) Defence.
 - (b) Foreign Affairs.
 - (c) Currency.
 - (d) Communications.
 - (e) Customs.
 - (f) Protection of Minority rights.
- (6) The Jews in Palestine shall be given semi-autonomy. They shall have the right to their own rural and urban district administration including schools, health institutes, and police subject to general supervision by the Syrian State.
- (7) Jerusalem shall be a city to which members of all religions shall have free access for pilgrimage and worship. A special commission composed of representatives of the three theocratic religions shall be set up to ensure this.
- (8) That if they demand it, the Maronites in the Lebanon shall be granted a privileged régime such as they possessed during the last years of the Ottoman Empire. This special régime like those to be set up in paragraphs 6 and 7 above shall rest on an International Guarantee.

If it is possible in the manner suggested above to create a Confederation of Arab States including Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Trans-Jordan at the beginning, to which other Arab States may later adhere, then a great many of the difficulties which have faced Great Britain and France in the Near East during the past two decades will disappear. The Arabs of Palestine at present fear that they will become a minority in a Jewish State, and therefore bitterly oppose the grant of special rights to the Jews, but this hostility would be allayed if Palestine became part of a large strong Arab State. The Jews could establish their National Home in those parts of Palestine, where they are now the majority with a greater feeling of security, because there would be more goodwill on the part of their Arab neighbours, and as a semi-autonomous community in a much larger State their economic opportunities would increase.

The British Empire is not founded on negations but on positive ideals. Free institutions and free co-operation give it a living force of tremendous strength. Upon this foundation of free co-operation a true union of many diverse peoples and countries has been formed, depending less upon stipulations and statistics and more upon the nobler and more permanent principles which are written on the heart and conscience of man. If an opportunity is given to the Arab peoples to establish such a free cooperation among themselves they will be prepared to deal generously with all the Jews living in their midst whether in Palestine or elsewhere. Conditions and guarantees there must be, but let them not constitute a dead hand lest they become a dead letter, as so many minority provisions in European constitutions became during the past twenty years.

If my proposals meet with favour they will require careful examination, so that the appropriate steps are taken at the right time and in the right order. Obviously, the union of the various parts of historic Syria must come first. It may at first take the form of a federation of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-Jordan, each state continuing its own local administration, leaving defence, foreign relations, currency and customs to the Central Government. On the other hand it may be found possible to unite Syria at once, making provision for the Jewish enclaves and the Jerusalem régime at the same time. Steps should be taken at once to define these enclaves and for this purpose it would be necessary to prepare an accurate ethnographical map of Palestine showing the number of Arabs and Jews in each Nahya and town, also, a map on the same scale showing the land under cultivation and the land which can be cultivated intensely in the future. An inquiry should also be made as to the number of Jews who have settled in Palestine since the outbreak of the war in September, 1939.

To secure Arab union sacrifices of sovereignty and vested interests may have to be made. Similar sacrifices have been made in the British Dominions and can be equally demanded from Arab leaders.

I have throughout assumed that as France before the war declared that she was prepared to grant independence to Syria and the Lebanon she will not be allowed by the United Nations to repudiate her offers, nor to obstruct any federation of Arab States by insisting on old privileges or antiquated rights.

Appendix (A)**THE McMAHON CORRESPONDENCE.****(Covering Letter To No. 1)****The Amir 'Abdullah to Mr. Ronald Storrs.**

Mecca, Ramadan 2, 1333.

(July 14, 1915).

COMPLIMENTARY TITLES,

I send my affectionate regard and respects to your esteemed self, and trust that you will ensure, as you know how to, the acceptance of the enclosed note which contains our proposals and conditions.

In this connexion, I wish to give you and your Government my assurance that you need have no anxiety about the intentions of our people, for they realise how closely their interests are bound to those of your Government. Do not trouble to send aeroplanes or warships to distribute news and reports as in the past our minds are now made up.

What we would request is that you should make it possible for the Egyptian Government to resume the consignment of the bounty of grain for the poor of Mecca and Madina, which was stopped last year. The arrival of this year's grain, together with last year's, would be valuable here for the promotion of our mutual interests. To a person of your quick understanding, this hint will suffice.

I beg of you not to send us any communications until you hear that our plans have matured, except for the reply to this letter and its enclosure, which should only be sent through the bearer. Perhaps you will think fit to give him a written warrant to enable him to pass through to you whenever we think it necessary to send him. He is dependable.

Compliments.

No. 1**The Sharif Husain's First Note To Sir Henry McMahon.**

Mecca, Ramadan, 2, 1333.

(July 14, 1915).

COMPLIMENTARY TITLES.

Whereas the entire Arab nation without exception is determined to assert its rights to live, gain its freedom and administer its own affairs in name and in fact;

And whereas the Arabs believe it to be in Great Britain's interest to lend them assistance and support in the fulfilment of their steadfast and legitimate aims to the exclusion of all other aims;

And whereas it is similarly to the advantage of the Arabs, in view of their geographical position and their economic interests, and in view of the well-known attitude of the Government of Great Britain, to prefer British assistance to any other;

For these reasons, the Arab nation has decided to approach the Government of Great Britain with a request for the approval, through one of their representatives if they think fit, of the following basic provisions which, as time presses, have not been made to include matters of relatively smaller importance, since such matters can wait until the time comes for their consideration:—

(1) Great Britain recognises the independence of the Arab countries which are bounded: on the north, by the line Mersin-Adana to parallel 37 degree N. and thence along the line Birejik—Urfa—Mardin—Midiat—Jazirat (ibn 'Umar)—Amadia to the Persian frontier; on the east, by the Persian frontier down to the Persian Gulf; on the south, by the Indian Ocean (with the exclusion of Aden whose status will remain as at present); on the west, by the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea back to Mersin.

(2) Great Britain will agree to the proclamation of an Arab Caliphate for Islam.

(3) The Sharifian Arab Government undertakes, other things being equal, to grant Great Britain preference in all economic enterprises in the Arab countries.

(4) With a view to ensuring the stability of Arab independence and the efficacy of the promised preference in economic enterprises, the two contracting parties undertake, in the event of any foreign state attacking either of them, to come to each other's assistance with all the resources of their military and naval forces; it being understood that peace will be concluded only when both parties concur.

In the event of one of the two parties embarking upon a war of offence, the other party will adopt an attitude of neutrality, but, if invited to join, will agree to confer with the other party as to the conditions of joint action.

(5) Great Britain agrees to the abolition of Capitulations in the Arab countries, and undertakes to assist the Sharifian Government in summoning an international congress to decree their abolition.

(6) Clauses 3 and 4 of the present Agreement are to remain in force for a period of fifteen years. Should either party desire an extension, due notice of one year before the expiry of that period will have to be given.

Therefore, since the entire Arab nation is (God be praised!) united in its resolve to pursue its noble aim to the end, at whatever cost, it requests the Government of Great Britain to return an answer, whether negatively or in the affirmative, within thirty days of the receipt of this message, in default of which it reserves its right to complete freedom of action, just as we will consider ourselves absolved from the letter and the spirit of the declaration which we made earlier through 'Ali Effendi.

Compliments.

Sir Henry McMahon's First Note To The Sharif Husain.

Cairo, August 30, 1915.

COMPLIMENTARY TITLES.

We have the honour to tender the gratitude due to you for the sentiments of sincere friendship for England which you display, and it pleases us, moreover, to learn that Your Lordship and your people are at one in believing that Arab interests are in harmony with British interests, and vice-versa.

In earnest of this, we hereby confirm to you the declaration of Lord Kitchener as communicated to you through 'Ali Effendi, in which was manifested our desire for the independence of the Arab countries and their inhabitants, and our readiness to approve an Arab caliphate upon its proclamation.

We now declare once more that the Government of Great Britain would welcome the reversion of the caliphate to a true Arab born of the blessed stock of the Prophet.

As for the question of frontiers and boundaries, negotiations would appear to be premature and a waste of time on details at this stage, with the War in progress and the Turks in effective occupation of the greater part of those regions. All the more so as a party of Arabs inhabiting those very regions have, to our amazement and sorrow, overlooked and neglected this valuable and incomparable opportunity; and, instead of coming to our aid, have lent their assistance to the Germans and the Turks; to that new despoiler, the German, and to that tyrannical oppressor, the Turk.

Nevertheless, we are fully prepared to despatch to Your Lordship whatever quantities of grain and other charitable gifts may be owed by Egypt to the Holy Land of Arabia and the noble Arabs. These will be forwarded, on a sign from Your Lordship, to whatever locality you may indicate.

We have made the necessary arrangements for facilitating the journeys of your messenger to us.

Compliments.

The Sharif Husain's Second Nete To Sir Henry McMahon.

Mecca, Shawwal 29, 1333.

(September 9, 1915).

COMPLIMENTARY TITLES.

We received your note of the 19th Shawwal, (August 30,) with gratification, and have given it the fullest consideration, notwithstanding the obscurity and the signs of lukewarmth and hesitancy we descried in it in regard to our essential clause. We find it necessary to affirm to Your Excellency our sentiments of amity with Great Britain and our readiness to ensure her a favoured place in all circumstances and in every manner, for in that way can the true interests of our co-religionists best be served.

Your Excellency will suffer me to say, in explanation of what I mean by lukewarmth and hesitancy, that your statements in regard to the question of frontiers and boundaries—namely that to discuss them at this stage were unprofitable and could only result in a waste of time since those regions are still occupied by their sovereign government, and so forth—reflect what I might almost describe as reluctance or something akin to reluctance, on your part.

The fact is that the proposed frontiers and boundaries represent not the suggestions of one individual whose claim might well await the conclusion of the War, but the demands of our people who believe that those frontiers form the minimum necessary to the establishment of the new order for which they are striving. This they are determined to obtain; and they have decided to discuss the matter, in the first resort, with that Power in whom they place their greatest confidence and reliance, and whom they regard as the pivot of justice, namely Great Britain.

In this, they are moved by considerations of the reciprocity of interests, the requirements of territorial organisation, and the wishes of the populations concerned; and also by their desire to see the foundations of their future life settled beforehand, so as to avoid finding themselves, when their new life is being established and organised, in opposition to or conflict with Great Britain or one of her allies—which God forbid. It should be noted that, in drawing up their proposed delimitation, they have not outstopped the bounds of the regions inhabited by their race.

For our aim, O respected Minister, is to ensure that the conditions which are essential to our future shall be secured on a foundation of reality, and not on highly-decorated phrases and titles. As for the caliphate, God have mercy on its soul and comfort the Moslems for their loss.

I am confident that Your Excellency will realise beyond all doubt that I have had nothing to do with the proposing of those boundaries, which include only populations of our race, and that

they were proposed by our people who regard them as being, to put it briefly, vitally and economically essential—as indeed they are.

In conclusion, we believe in all sincerity that your loyalty will prevail, whether you are satisfied with us or displeased; and that you will not wish to seize upon the fact that some of our people are still with the utmost zeal furthering Ottoman designs, as stated in your letter under reference, as an excuse for treating our aspirations with such lukewarmness and hesitancy. I think Your Excellency is above denying that our demands are fundamental, nay, that they are the very substance and essence of our existence, be it from the material, the spiritual or the moral point of view. Up to this very moment, I have been endeavouring, in person and with all my powers, to enforce the prescriptions of our Sacred Law in my country and in all that concerns me in relation to the rest of the empire, until God issue His decree.

For these reasons, and the better to set your mind at ease, I may state that the people of all those countries, including those of whom you say that they are zealously furthering German and Ottoman designs, are awaiting the result of the present negotiations, which depend solely upon whether you reject or admit the proposed frontiers, and upon whether or not you will help us to secure their spiritual and other rights against evil and danger. Please communicate to us the decision of the British Government on this point, for our guidance as to what suits their policy, and as to what steps it behoves us to take. For the rest, it is God Who decrees the past and the future, He ordains all things, exalted be His Name!

With regard to our request for the despatch of the people's bounty, with the customary purses from the Ministry of Auqaf and all that it is usual to send with the Pilgrimage convoy, I had in view that their despatch would be a means of substantiating the terms of your proclamations to the world, and more particularly the Moslem world, in which you stated that your hostility was solely directed against the usurpers of the caliphate and, hence, of the rights of all Moslems. To say nothing of the fact that the said bounty comes from specific endowments which have nothing to do with politics. If you decide to send them, let the bounty due on account of the past two years be consigned in a special steamer to Jedda as usual in the name of the people, and let the master or the special officer who is usually charged year by year with the duty of delivery communicate with the authorities at Jedda on arrival at the port, and ask for the competent official who is to take delivery of the grain against the proper receipt to be signed by the receiving officer. It should be noted that only the signature of that officer may be accepted, and the skipper or special officer should be instructed that if any obstruction is attempted, he should threaten to return with his cargo to the port of departure. The consignment is to be formally received by the committee known as the "Committee for dealing with the People's Bounty."

If you should wish to reply to this note, let the reply be sent by the bearer.

Compliments.

No. 4

Sir Henry McMahon's Second Note To The Sharif Husain.

Cairo, October 24, 1915.

COMPLIMENTARY TITLES.

I have, with gratification and pleasure, received your note of the 29th Shawwal, 1333, and its tokens of sincere friendship have filled me with satisfaction and contentment.

I regret to find that you inferred from my last note that my attitude toward the question of frontiers and boundaries was one of hesitancy and lukewarmth. Such was in no wise the intention of my note. All I meant was that I considered that the time had not yet come in which that question could be discussed in a conclusive manner.

But, having realised from your last note that you considered the question important, vital and urgent, I hastened to communicate to the Government of Great Britain the purport of your note. It gives me the greatest pleasure to convey to you, on their behalf, the following declarations which, I have no doubt, you will receive with satisfaction and acceptance.

The districts of Mersin and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab, and must on that account be excepted from the proposed delimitation.

Subject to that modification, and without prejudice to the treaties concluded between us and certain Arab Chiefs, we accept that delimitation.

As for the regions lying within the proposed frontiers, in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally France, I am authorised to give you the following pledges on behalf of the Government of Great Britain, and to reply as follows to your note:

(1) That, subject to the modifications stated above, Great Britain is prepared to recognise and uphold the independence of the Arabs in all the regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the Sharif of Mecca;

(2) That Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression, and will recognise the obligation of preserving them from aggression;

(3) That, when circumstances permit, Great Britain will help the Arabs with her advice and assist them in the establishment of governments to suit those diverse regions;

(4) That it is understood that the Arabs have already decided to seek the counsels and advice of Great Britain exclusively; and that such European advisers and officials as may be needed to establish a sound system of administration shall be British;

(5) That, as regards the two vilayets of Baghdad and of Basra, the Arabs recognise that the fact of Great Britain's established position and interests there will call for the setting up of special administrative arrangements to protect those regions from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of their inhabitants, and to safeguard our mutual economic interests.

I am confident that this declaration will convince you, beyond all doubt, of Great Britain's sympathy with the aspirations of her friends the Arabs; and that it will result in a lasting and solid alliance with them, of which one of the immediate consequences will be the expulsion of the Turks from the Arab countries and the liberation of the Arab peoples from the Turkish yoke which has weighed on them all these long years.

I have confined myself in this note vital questions of primary importance. If there are any other matters in your notes, which have been overlooked, we can revert to them at some suitable time in the future.

I have heard with great satisfaction and pleasure that the Sacred Kiswa and the charitable gifts which had gone with it, had arrived safely and that, thanks to your wise directions and arrangements, they were landed without trouble or damage in spite of the risks and difficulties created by the present deplorable war. We pray Almighty God that He may bring a lasting peace and freedom to mankind.

I am sending this note with your faithful messenger, Shaikh Muhammad ibn 'Aref ibn 'Uraifan, who will lay before you certain interesting matters which, as they are of secondary importance, I have abstained from mentioning in this note.

Compliments.

No. 5

The Sharif Husain's Third Note To Sir Henry McMahon.

Mecca, Zul-Hejja 27, 1333.
(November 5, 1915).

COMPLIMENTARY TITLES.

With great gratification have we received your note of the 15th Zul-Hejja (October 24) to which we would reply as follows:

First, in order to facilitate agreement and serve the cause of Islam by the removal of possible sources of hardship and tribulation, and in earnest of the particular esteem in which we hold Great Britain, we no longer insist on the inclusion of the districts of Mersin and Adana in the Arab Kingdom. As for the vilayets of Aleppo and Bairut and their western maritime coasts, these are purely Arab provinces in which the Moslem is indistinguishable from the Christian,

for they are both the descendants of one forefather. And we Moslems intend, in those provinces, to follow the precepts laid down by the Commander of the Faithful, 'Umar ibn al-Khattab (God have mercy upon him!), and the caliphs who come after him, when he enjoined upon the Moslems to treat the Christians on a footing with themselves, saying: they are to enjoy the same rights and bear the same obligations as ourselves. They will have, moreover, their denominational privileges, as far as the public interest allows

Secondly, since the provinces of Iraq were part of the former Arab Empire, and indeed were the seat of government in the days of the Caliph 'Ali ibn Abi-Talib (God's favour be upon him!) and of all the caliphs after him; and since it was in those very provinces (and more particularly in Basra which was the first centre of Arab culture) that the civilisation of the Arabs and the expansion of their power flourished—a fact gives them in the eyes of all Arabs, both far and near, the precious significance of an unforgettable heritage; for these reasons, we should find it impossible to persuade or compel the Arab nation to renounce that honourable association. On the other hand, since the safeguards referred to in your clause 5 concerning Great Britain's interests are naturally secured—for the safeguarding of British interests with which are bound up our own is one of our main concerns—we should be willing, in our desire to facilitate agreement, to allow those parts which are now occupied by British troops to remain so occupied for a period to be determined by negotiation, without prejudice to the rights of either party or injury to the natural wealth and resources of those parts. It being provided that, during the period of the occupation, the Arab Kingdom shall receive suitable pecuniary assistance towards the burden of expenditure which a nascent kingdom inevitably has to bear; and that the agreements in force with certain Chiefs in those parts will be respected.

Thirdly, your advocacy of speedy action seems to us to entail risks as well as advantages. In the first place, premature action might give rise among those Moslems who do not as yet appreciate the realities of the situation, to the criticism that, by proclaiming a revolt, we are seeking the disruption of Islam. In the second place, we have to consider what our position would be against Turkey who is aided by all the might of Germany, in the event of one of the Entente Powers weakening to the extent of being compelled to make peace with the Central Powers; what attitude would Great Britain and her remaining allies adopt to preclude the possibility of the Arab nation being left alone to face Turkey and her allies? We would have had no anxiety had the conflict lain between us and the Turks alone. These aspects of the question have to be considered especially as, if we were to enter the War in an informal way, it might be contended by some of the belligerents that they have a right, in concluding the peace, to interfere in our affairs.

Fourthly, the Arabs firmly believe that, after the War, the German-ridden Turks will try to give them constant provocation, in religious as well as temporal matters, and to wreak the utmost vengeance upon them. On their side, the Arabs have resolved and

vowed to fight the Turks and continue fighting them until not one of them (save women and children) remains in any of the Arab countries. Our present deliberation is on account of the considerations stated above.

Fifthly, the moment the Arabs feel confident that, when the time comes for the conclusion of peace in Europe, Great Britain and her allies will not leave them in the lurch face to face with Turkey and Germany, but that they intend to help them and advocate their case effectively in the peace negotiations, from that moment will Arab participation in the War undoubtedly serve the general Arab interest.

Sixthly, our previous communication dated the 29th Shawwal, 1333, makes it superfluous for us to reply to clauses 3 and 4 of your letter, relating to forms of administration, advisers and officials, especially as it is clear from Your Excellency's declarations that there will be no interference in our internal affairs.

Seventhly, we request a clear and final reply, in the shortest possible time, to the questions and problems set forth above, so that the necessary action may be taken with the least possible delay. In our desire to secure agreement which should be satisfactory to both sides, we have gone to the furthest lengths of concession. For we know that the outcome of this war for us can only be either to achieve victory, which will secure to the Arabs a life worthy of their ancient glory, or to find destruction in the attempt. Were it not for the determination shown by the Arabs to realise their aspirations, I would have elected to retire to some mountain-top. But they pressed me to lead the movement to its goal.

Compliments.

No. 6

Sir Henry McMahon's Third Note To The Sharif Husain.

Cairo, December 13, 1915.

COMPLIMENTARY TITLES.

Your note of the 27th Zul-Hejja, 1333, has reached me, and I was glad to find that you consent to the exclusion of the vilayets of Mersin and Adana from the boundaries of the Arab countries.

I have also received with the utmost pleasure and satisfaction your assurances that the Arabs are resolved on following the precepts of the Caliph 'Umar ibn al-Khattab (the blessing of God be upon him!) and of the other early caliphs which guarantee equal rights and privileges to all creeds alike.

Your statement that the Arabs are prepared to recognise and respect all our treaties with other Arab Chiefs is of course taken to apply to all territories to be included within the frontiers of the Arab Kingdom, for Great Britain cannot repudiate agreements already concluded between her and those Chiefs.

As for the two vilayets of Aleppo and Bairut, the Government of Great Britain have fully understood your statement in that respect and noted it with the greatest care. But as the interests of their ally France are involved in those two provinces, the question calls for careful consideration. We shall communicate again with you on this subject, at the appropriate time.

The Government of Great Britain, as I have previously informed you, are prepared to give all the guarantees and assistance in their power to the Arab Kingdom. But their interests in the Vilayet of Baghdad necessitated a friendly and stable administration, such as you have outlined. The proper safeguarding of those interests calls for further and more detailed consideration than the present situation and the speed with which these negotiations are being conducted permit.

We fully approve your desire to proceed warily, and do not wish to impel you to hasty action which might obstruct the success of your objectives. But, at the same time, we deem it imperative that you should turn your endeavour to uniting the Arab peoples to our joint cause and to urging them to abstain from aiding our enemies in any manner whatsoever. On the success of your endeavours, and on the efficiency of the measures which, when the time comes, the Arabs will find it possible to take in aid of our cause, will the strength and permanence of our agreement depend.

In these circumstances, the Government of Great Britain have authorised me to declare to your Lordship that you may rest confident that Great Britain does not intend to conclude any peace whatsoever, of which the freedom of the Arab peoples and their liberation from German and Turkish domination do not form an essential condition.

In token of our good faith, and as a contribution to your endeavour in our joint cause, I am sending the sum of £. 20,000 with your trusted messenger.

Compliments.

No. 7

The Sharif Husain's Fourth Note To Sir Henry McMahon.

Mecca, Safar 25, 1334.

(January 1, 1916).

COMPLIMENTARY TITLES.

I have received your note of the 9th Safar, 1334 (December 13, 1915), with the bearer of this, and noted its contents which have filled me with the utmost satisfaction and gratification, inasmuch as they set my mind at rest over one point, namely the arrival of Muhammad Sharif al-Faruqi and his interview with you. You will now have satisfied yourself that our attitude was not promoted by personal desires, which would have been foolish, but was the result

of the decisions taken and the desires expressed by our people; and that our role in the matter was confined to conveying and putting into effect those desires and decisions, thus merely discharging a duty with which our people had invested us. It is, in my view, most important that Your Excellency should realise that.

As for your statements concerning Iraq and the compensation to be paid during the period of occupation, I would illustrate the friendly sentiments animating us towards Great Britain and the confidence we repose in her, both in word and in deed, in the spirit as well as the letter, by leaving the assessment of the compensation to her wisdom and sense of fair play.

With regard to the northern parts and their coastal regions, we have already stated, in our previous note, the utmost that it was possible for us to modify. We made those modifications solely in order to achieve the ends which, Almighty God willing, we desire to attain. In that same spirit, we have felt bound to steer clear of that which might have impaired the alliance between Great Britain and France and their concord during the calamities of the present war. On the other hand—and this Your Excellency must clearly understand—we shall deem it our duty, at the earliest opportunity after the conclusion of the War, to claim from you Bairut and its coastal regions which we will overlook for the moment on account of France.

I find it superfluous to point out that this arrangement also serves Great Britain's interests best; that it safeguards them as fully—if not more—as it secures our rights; and that no other arrangement is possible by which it could fall to Great Britain to achieve the aim, which she has at heart, of seeing her friends in contentment and happiness. All the more so as the proximity of the French to us would be a source of difficulties and disputes such as would render the establishment of peaceful conditions impossible. To say nothing of the fact that the people of Bairut are resolutely opposed to such a dismemberment, and would drive us to take a stand which might cause concern and trouble to Great Britain on a scale not far short of her present preoccupations, owing to what we firmly believe to be the community, and indeed the identity, of your interests and our own, and to be the only explanation of our unwillingness to deal with anyone else but Great Britain in these negotiations.

Thus any concession designed to give France or any other Power possession of a single square foot of territory in those parts is quite out of the question. In proclaiming this, I place all my reliance on the declarations which concluded your note, and this reliance is such that, at our death, it shall be inherited by those who live after us.

Your Excellency may rest assured, and Great Britain may rest assured, that we shall adhere to our resolve to which reference has already been made, and which was made known to Storrs—that able and accomplished man—two years ago. We are only waiting for an opportunity in consonance with our situation. It appears to be drawing nearer, and the hand of destiny seems to be driving it

towards us in timely and unmistakable fashion, as though to provide us and those who think like us with weapons for meeting the criticisms and facing the responsibilities in store.

Your statement that you do not wish to impel us to hasty action which might obstruct the success of your objectives renders further explanation superfluous, except that we shall have to let you know in due course our requirements in the way of arms, ammunition and so forth.

Compliments.

No. 8

Sir Henry McMahon's Fourth Note To The Sharif Husain.

Cairo, January 30, 1916.

COMPLIMENTARY TITLES.

With great pleasure and satisfaction have we received your note of the 25th Safar, 1334, from the hand of your faithful messenger who never fails to give us your oral messages as well. We fully realise and appreciate the motives which animate you in the momentous issue with which we are concerned, and we do not question the fact that you are working for the good of the Arab nation without any ulterior motive whatsoever.

We have noted what you say with regard to the Vilayet of Baghdad, and we shall examine the matter with the utmost care after the defeat of the enemy, when the time comes for the conclusion of peace.

As for the norther regions, we note with great satisfaction your desire to avoid anything that might impair the alliance between Great Britain and France. It has not escaped you that it is our firm determination not to allow anything, however small, to stand in the way of our ending this war in complete victory. Moreover, when victory is attained, the friendship between Great Britain and France will be stronger and closer than ever, cemented as it will have been by the shedding of British and French blood—the blood of those who have fallen fighting side by side in the cause of right and freedom.

The Arab countries are now associated in that noble aim which can be attained by uniting our forces and acting in unison. We pray God that success may bind us to each other in a lasting friendship which shall bring profit and contentment to us all.

We are very glad to hear that you are endeavouring to gain all the Arab tribes over to our joint cause, and to prevent them from giving any assistance to our enemies. We leave it to your discretion to choose the most suitable opportunity for the initiation of more decisive measures.

You will doubtless inform us, through the bearer of this note, of the ways in which we can help you. You may rest assured that all your requests will always be carefully considered and most expeditiously dealt with.

You will surely have heard that Sayyed Ahmad al-Sharif, the Sanusi, has lent an ear to the intrigues of our enemies and started hostilities against us, and you will doubtless be sorry to hear that he has so far lost sight of Arab interests that he has thrown in his lot with our enemies. He has now fallen a victim to his own misguided ways, and met with adversity at every turn. This may yet convince him of his error and lead him back into the path of reason and of peace, out of pity for his poor followers whom he is guiding to destruction.

Your faithful messenger who carries this note to you will give you all our news.

Compliments.

Appendix (B)**THE ANGLO—FRANCO—RUSSIAN AGREEMENT.***(April-May 1916)*

Generally known as

THE SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT.

(The Sykes-Picot Agreement was concluded in the form of diplomatic notes exchanged between the Governments of the three Powers, in which the claims of each Power to portions of the Ottoman Empire, after its dismemberment were recognised by the other two. Notes defining the Russian share were exchanged in Petrograd on April 26, 1916, between the Minister of Foreign Affairs (M. Sazonoff) and the French Ambassador (M. Paléologue), and in London a few weeks later between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Edward Grey) and the Russian Ambassador (Count Benkendorff). Notes defining the British and French shares were exchanged in London on May 9 and May 16, between Sir Edward Grey and the French Ambassador (M. Paul Cambon).

The text reproduced below is only that of the Anglo-French section of the Agreement, since that section alone dealt with the future of Arab territories. It is a translation of the French version published in A. Giannini, *Documenti per la Storia della Pace orientale*, Rome, 1933).

TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT.*Concluded in London on May 16, 1916.*

1. France and Great Britain are prepared to recognise and uphold an independent Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States in the areas shown as (A) and (B) on the annexed map, under the suzerainty of an Arab Chief. France in area (A) and Great Britain in area (B) shall have a right of priority in enterprises and local loans. France in area (A) and Great Britain in area (B) shall alone supply foreign advisers or officials on the request of the Arab State or the Confederation of Arab States.

2. France in the Blue area and Great Britain in the Red area shall be at liberty to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as they may desire or as they may deem fit to establish after agreement with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States.

3. In the Brown area there shall be established an international administration of which the form will be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and after subsequent agreement with the other Allies and the representatives of the Sharif of Mecca.

4. There shall be accorded to Great Britain

- (a) The ports of Haifa and Acre;
- (b) Guarantee of a specific supply of water from the Tigris and the Euphrates in area (A) for area (B).

His Majesty's Government, on their part, undertake that they will at no time initiate negotiations for the concession of Cyprus to any third Power without the previous consent of the French Government.

5. Alexandretta shall be a free port as regards the trade of the British Empire and there shall be no differentiation in treatment with regard to port dues or the extension of special privileges affecting British shipping and commerce; there shall be freedom of transit for British goods through Alexandretta and over railways through the Blue area, whether such goods are going to or coming from the Red area, area (A) or area (B); and there shall be no differentiation in treatment, direct or indirect, at the expense of British goods on any railway or of British goods and shipping in any port serving the areas in question.

Haifa shall be a free port as regards the trade of France, her colonies and protectorates, and there shall be no differentiation in treatment or privilege with regard to port dues against French shipping and commerce. There shall be freedom of transit through Haifa and over British railways through the Brown area, whether such goods are coming from or going to the Blue area, area (A) or area (B), and there shall be no differentiation in treatment, direct or indirect, at the expense of French goods on any railway or of French goods and shipping in any port serving the areas in question.

6. In area (A), the Baghdad Railway shall not be extended northwards beyond Samarra, until a railway connecting Baghdad with Aleppo along the basin of the Euphrates will have been completed, and then only with the concurrence of the two Governments.

7. Great Britain shall have the right to build, administer and be the sole owner of the railway connecting Haifa with area (B). She shall have, in addition, the right in perpetuity and at all times of carrying troops on that line. It is understood by both Governments that this railway is intended to facilitate communication between Baghdad and Haifa, and it is further understood that, in the event of technical difficulties and expenditure incurred in the maintenance of this line in the Brown area rendering the execution of the project impracticable, the French Government will be prepared to consider plans for enabling the line in question to traverse the polygon formed by Baniyas-Umm Qais-Salkhad-Tall 'Osda-Mismieh before reaching area (B).

8. For a period of twenty years, the Turkish customs tariff shall remain in force throughout the Blue and Red areas as well as in areas (A) and (B), and no increase in the rates of duties and no alteration of *ad valorem* duties into specific duties shall be made without the consent of the two Powers.

There shall be no internal customs barriers between any of the areas mentioned above. the customs duties to be levied on goods destined for the interior shall be collected at the ports of entry and remitted to the Administration of the area of destination.

9. It is understood that the French Government will at no time initiate any negotiations for the cession of their rights and will not cede their prospective rights in the Blue area to any third Power other than the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States, without the previous consent of His Majesty's Government who, on their part, give the French Government a similar undertaking in respect of the Red area.

10. The British and French Governments shall agree to abstain from acquiring and to withhold their consent to a third Power acquiring territorial possessions in the Arabian Peninsula; nor shall they consent to the construction by a third Power of a naval base in the islands on the eastern seaboard of the Red Sea. This, however, will not prevent such rectification of the Aden boundary as might be found necessary in view of the recent Turkish attack.

11. The negotiations with the Arab States shall be pursued through the same channel as heretofore in the name of the two Powers.

12. It is understood, moreover, that measures for controlling the importation of arms into the Arab territory will be considered by the two Governments.

The Areas referred to in the text by letters or colours are as follows:—

Blue Area: Cilicia, Lebanon.

Red Area: Vilayets of Baghdad and Basra.

Brown Area: Palestine.

A. Area: Present Syrian State and Mosul Vilayat excluding Kirkuk.

B. Area: Transjordan and desert area extending to Hit and Kirkuk.

Appendix (C)

PROCLAMATION.

To the People of the Baghdad Vilayat.

In the name of my King and in the name of the peoples over whom he rules, I address you as follows:—

Our military operations have as their object the defeat of the enemy and the driving of him from these territories. In order to complete this task I am charged with absolute and supreme control of all regions in which British Forces operate, but our Armies have not come into your Cities and Lands as Conquerors, or enemies, but as Liberators.

Since the days of Hulaku your Citizens have been subject to the tyranny of strangers, your palaces have fallen into ruins, your gardens have sunken in desolation and your forefathers and yourselves have groaned in bondage. Your sons have been carried off to wars not of your seeking, your wealth has been stripped from you by unjust men and squandered in distant places.

Since the days of Midhat Pasha the Turks have talked of reforms yet do not the ruins and wastes of to-day testify to the vanity of those promises?

It is the wish, not only of my King and his peoples, but it is also the wish of the Great Nations with whom he is in alliance, that you should prosper, even as in the past, when your lands were fertile, when your ancestors gave to the world literature, science and art and Baghdad was one of the wonders of the world.

Between your people and the Dominions of my King there has been a close bond of interest and for 200 years have the Merchants of Baghdad and Great Britain traded together in mutual profit and friendship. On the other hand, the Germans and Turks, who have despoiled you and yours, have for 20 years made Baghdad a centre of power from which to assail the power of the British and the Allies of the British in Persia and Arabia. Therefore, the British Government cannot remain indifferent as to what takes place in your country, now or in the future, for, in duty to the interests of the British people and their Allies, the British Government cannot risk that being done in Baghdad again which has been done by the Turks and Germans during the war.

But you, the people of Baghdad, whose commercial professions and whose safety from oppression and invasion must ever be a matter of the closest concern to the British Government, are not to understand that it is the wish of the British Government, to impose upon you alien institutions. It is the hope of the British Government that the aspirations of your philosophers and writers shall be realised once again. The people of Baghdad shall flourish and enjoy their wealth and substance under institutions which are in consonance with their sacred laws and their racial ideals. In the Hejaz the

Arabs have expelled the Turks and Germans who oppressed them and have proclaimed Sharif Hussein as their King and His Lordship rules in independence and freedom and is the ally of the Nations who are fighting against the power of Turkey and Germany. So, indeed, rise once more to greatness and renown amongst the peoples of the Earth and that it shall bind itself to this end in unity and concord.

Many noble Arabs have perished in the cause of freedom at the hands of those alien rulers, the Turks, who oppressed them. It is the determination of the Government of Great Britain and the Great Powers allied to Great Britain that these noble Arabs shall not have suffered in vain. It is the desire and hope of the British people and Nations in alliance with them that the Arab race may rise once more to greatness and renown amongst the people of the earth and that it shall bind itself to this and live in unity and concord.

O! People of Baghdad. Remember that for 26 generations you have suffered under strange tyrants who have ever endeavoured to set one Arab house against another in order that they might profit by your dissensions. Therefore, I am commmanded to invite you, through your Nobles and Elders and Representatives, to participate in the management of your civil affairs in collaboration with the Political Representatives of Great Britain who accompany the British Army so that you may unite with your kinsmen in the North, East, South and West in realising the aspirations of your race.

F. S. MAUDE, LIEUT-GENERAL,
Commanding British Forces in Iraq.

Army Headquarters,
Baghdad.

the 19th March, 1917.
(24th Jomadi-al-Awal, 1335).

Appendix (D)**THE BALFOUR DECLARATION.**

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

Appendix (E)

COMMUNICATION FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO THE KING OF THE HEJAZ

(The text of the original communication has often appeared in the Arabic Press in facsimile reproduction from a photostat copy supplied by the late King Hussein).

The original communication was in Arabic.

The Acting British Agent, Jedda to the King Husain.

Jedda, February 8, 1918.

COMPLIMENTARY TITLES.

I am directed by His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner (1) to forward to Your Majesty the text of a telegraphic message which His Excellency has had from the Foreign Office in London for transmission as a communication from His Britannic Majesty's Government to Your Majesty. The text is verbatim as follows:

Begins. The loyal motives which have prompted Your Majesty to forward to the High Commissioner the letter addressed by the Turkish commander-in-chief in Syria to His Highness the Amir Faisal and to Ja'far Pasha have caused His Majesty's Government the liveliest satisfaction. The steps taken by Your Majesty in this connexion are only a token of the friendship and mutual sincerity which have always inspired the relations between the Government of the Hejaz and His Majesty's Government. It would be superfluous to point out that the object aimed at by Turkey is to sow doubt and suspicion between the Allied Powers and those Arabs who, under Your Majesty's leadership and guidance, are striving nobly to recover their ancient freedom. The Turkish policy is to create dissension by luring the Arabs into believing that the Allied Powers have designs on the Arab countries, and by representing to the Allies that the Arabs might be made to renounce their aspirations. But such intrigues cannot succeed in sowing dissension among those whose minds are directed by a common purpose to a common end.

His Majesty's Government and their allies stand steadfastly by every cause aiming at the liberation of the oppressed nations, and they are determined to stand by the Arab peoples in their struggle for the establishment of an Arab world in which law shall replace Ottoman injustice, and in which unity shall prevail over the rivalries artificially provoked by the policy of Turkish officials. His Majesty's Government re-affirm their former pledge in regard to the liberation

(1) i.e., Sir Reginald Wingate, High Commissioner for Egypt.

of the Arab peoples. His Majesty's Government have hitherto made it their policy to ensure that liberation, and it remains the policy they are determined unflinchingly to pursue by protecting such Arabs as are already liberated from all dangers and perils, and by assisting those who are still under the yoke of the tyrants to obtain their freedom. Ends.

Compliments.

J. R. BASSETT, LT.-COL.,
Acting British Agent, Jedda.

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Appendix (F)

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S DECLARATION TO THE SEVEN ARABS.

(June 16, 1918.)

(This Declaration was made in reply to a memorial submitted to the Foreign Office, through the Arab Bureau in Cairo, by seven Arab leaders domiciled in Egypt.)

The Declaration was read out by an officer of the Arab Bureau at a meeting of the seven Arab leaders, which had been specially convened for the purpose on June 16, 1918, in Cairo.

In Arab circles this Declaration is usually known as the Declaration to the Seven).

DECLARATION TO THE SEVEN.

His Majesty's Government have considered the memorial of the Seven with great care. They fully appreciate the reasons for the desire of its authors to retain their anonymity, ⁽¹⁾ but the fact that the memorial is anonymous has in no way detracted from the value which His Majesty's Government assign to that document.

The territories mentioned in the memorial fall into four categories:—

- (i) Territories which were free and independent before the outbreak of the War;
- (ii) Territories liberated from Turkish rule by the Arabs themselves;
- (iii) Territories liberated from Turkish rule by the action of the Allied armies;
- (iv) Territories still under Turkish rule.

With regard to the first two categories, ⁽²⁾ His Majesty's Government recognise the complete and sovereign independence of the Arabs inhabiting those territories, and support them in their struggle for freedom.

With regard to the territories occupied by the Allied armies, ⁽³⁾ His Majesty's Government invite the attention of the memorialists to the proclamations issued by the commander-in-chief on the occasions

(1) The memorialists were Rafiq al-'Azam; Shaikh Kamel al-Qassab; Mukhtar al-Sulh; 'Abdul-Rahman Shabandar; Khaled al-Hakim; Fauzi al-Bakri; Hasan Himadeh.

(2) i.e., the independent states of the Arabian Peninsula, and the Hejaz as far north as 'Aqaba.

(3) In June 1918, when this statement was issued, those territories comprised the greater part of Iraq (inclusive of Basra and Baghdad) and the southern half of Palestine (inclusive Jerusalem and Jaffa).

of the capture of Baghdad (March 19, 1917) and of the capture of Jerusalem (December 9, 1917). These proclamations define the policy of His Majesty's Government towards the inhabitants of those regions, which is that the future government of those territories should be based upon the principle of the consent of the governed. This policy will always be that of His Majesty's Government.

With regard to the territories in the fourth category, (4) it is the desire of His Majesty's Government that the oppressed peoples in those territories should obtain their freedom and independence. His Majesty's Government will continue to work for the achievement of that object. They are fully aware of the difficulties and perils which threaten those who are striving for the (liberation?) (1) of the inhabitants of those territories.

In spite of those obstacles, however, His Majesty's Government believe that the difficulties can be overcome, and they are prepared to give every support to those who are striving to overcome them. They are ready to consider any scheme of co-operation which does not conflict with the military operations in hand or with the political principles proclaimed by His Majesty's Government and their allies.

(4) i.e., the hitherto unliberated portions of Iraq and Syria.

(1) This word is obscure in the Arabic source.

Appendix (G)

ANGLO—FRENCH DECLARATION.

(February 8, 1918).

(This Declaration was issued in Palestine, Syria and Iraq, in the form of an official communiqué emanating from General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, dated November 7, 1918.

The text was given out to the Press, on the authority of the military censorship department, with instructions that it be given special prominence. Copies of it were posted on the public notice-boards in all towns and a great many villages in the Arab territories then occupied by the Allied forces, that is to say throughout the length and breadth of Palestine, Syria and Iraq.

The Declaration appears to have been originally drawn up in French. Official versions that have appeared in English are obvious translations, not excluding that which was circulated in answer to a question in the House of Commons on the 25th July 1921).

ANGLO—FRENCH DECLARATION.

November 7, 1918.

The goal envisaged by France and Great Britain in prosecuting in the East the War set in train by German ambition is the complete and final liberation of the peoples who have for so long been oppressed by the Turks, and the setting up of national governments and administrations that shall derive authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous populations.

In pursuance of those intentions, France and Great Britain agree to further and assist in the setting up of indigenous governments and administrations in Syria ⁽¹⁾ and Mesopotamia ⁽²⁾ which have already been liberated by the Allies, as well as in those territories which they are endeavouring to liberate, and to recognise them as soon as they are actually set up.

Far from wishing to impose this or that system upon the populations of those regions, their (i.e., France's and Great Britain's) only concern is to offer such support and efficacious help as will ensure the smooth working of the governments and administrations which those populations will have elected of their own free will to have; to secure impartial and equal justice for all; to facilitate the economic development of the country by promoting and encouraging local initiative; to foster the spread of education; and to put an end to the dissensions which Turkish policy has for so long exploited. Such is the task which the two Allied Powers wish to undertake in the liberated territories.

(1) In official parlance, this name was still used to denote the whole of geographical Syria, from the Taurus range to the Egyptian frontier.

(2) The term is used here to denote the region made up of the former Ottoman Vilayets of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, which has throughout this book been referred to (and is now universally known) as Iraq.

Appendix (H)

TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND 'IRAQ.

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF GREAT BRITAIN, IRELAND AND THE
BRITISH DOMINIONS BEYOND THE SEAS, EMPEROR OF INDIA,
AND HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF 'IRAQ,

WHEREAS they desire to consolidate the friendship and to maintain and perpetuate the relations of good understanding between their respective countries; and

WHEREAS His Britannic Majesty undertook in the Treaty of Alliance signed at Baghdad on the thirteenth day of January, One thousand nine hundred and twenty-six of the Christian Era, corresponding to the twenty-eight day of Jamadi-al-Ukhra, One thousand three hundred forty-four, Hijrah, that he would take into active consideration at successive intervals of four years the question whether it was possible for him to press for the admission of 'Iraq into the League of Nations; and

WHEREAS His Majesty's Government in Great Britain and Northern Ireland informed the 'Iraq Government without qualification or proviso on the fourteenth day of September, One thousand nine hundred and twenty-nine, that they were prepared to support the candidature of 'Iraq for admission to the League of Nations in the year One thousand nine hundred and thirty-two, and announced to the Council of the League on the fourth day of November, One thousand nine hundred and twenty-nine, that this was their intention; and

WHEREAS the mandatory responsibilities accepted by His Britannic Majesty in respect of 'Iraq will automatically terminate upon the admission of 'Iraq to the League of Nations; and

WHEREAS His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of 'Iraq consider that the relation which will subsist between them as independent sovereigns should be defined by the conclusion of a Treaty of Alliance and Amity;

Have agreed to conclude a new Treaty for this purpose on terms of complete freedom, equality, and independence which will become operative upon the entry of 'Iraq into the League of Nations, and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:—

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF GREAT BRITAIN, IRELAND AND THE
BRITISH DOMINIONS BEYOND THE SEAS, EMPEROR OF INDIA,

FOR GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND.

Lieutenant Colonel Sir Francis Henry Humphrys, Knight
Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order, Knight Commander

of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Knight Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, Companion of the Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire, High Commissioner of His Britannic Majesty in 'Iraq; and

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF 'IRAQ:

General Nuri Pasha Al Sa'id, Order of the Nahda, Second Class, Order of the Istiqlal, Second Class, Companion of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Companion of the Distinguished Service Order, Prime Minister of the 'Iraq Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs,

who having communicated their full powers, found in due form, have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of 'Iraq

There shall be established between the High Contracting Parties a close alliance in consecration of their friendship, their cordial understanding and their good relations, and there shall be full and frank consultation between them in all matters of foreign policy which may affect their common interests.

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to adopt in foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance or might create difficulties for the other party thereto.

ARTICLE 2.

Each High Contracting Party will be represented at the Court of the other High Contracting Party by a diplomatic representative duly accredited.

ARTICLE 3.

Should any dispute between 'Iraq and a third State produced a situation which involves the risk of a rupture with that State, the High Contracting Parties will concert together with a view to the settlement of the said dispute by peaceful means in accordance with the provision of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of other international obligations which may be applicable to the case.

ARTICLE 4.

Should, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3 above, either of the High Contracting Parties be engaged in war, the other High Contracting Party will, subject always to the provisions of Article 9 below, immediately come to his aid in the capacity of an ally. In the event of an imminent menace of war the High Contracting Parties will immediately concert together the necessary measures of defence. The aid of His Majesty the King of 'Iraq in the event of war or the imminent menace of war will consist in furnishing to His Britannic

Majesty on 'Iraq territory all facilities and assistance in his power, including the use of railways, rivers, ports, aerodromes and means of communication.

ARTICLE 5.

It is understood between the High Contracting Parties that responsibility for the maintenance of internal order in 'Iraq and subject to the provisions of Article 4 above, for the defence of 'Iraq from external aggression, rests with His Majesty the King of 'Iraq. Nevertheless, His Majesty the King of 'Iraq recognises that the permanent maintenance and protection in all circumstances of the essential communications of His Britannic Majesty is in the common interest of the High Contracting Parties. For this purpose, and in order to facilitate the discharge of the obligations of His Britannic Majesty under Article 4 above, His Majesty the King of 'Iraq undertakes to grant to His Britannic Majesty, for the duration of the Alliance, sites for air bases to be selected by His Britannic Majesty at or in the vicinity of Basrah and for an air base to be selected by His Britannic Majesty to the west of the Euphrates. His Majesty the King of 'Iraq further authorises His Britannic Majesty to maintain forces upon 'Iraq territory at the above localities in accordance with the provisions of the Annexure of this Treaty, on the understanding that the presence of those forces shall not constitute in any manner an occupation, and will in no way prejudice the sovereign rights of 'Iraq.

ARTICLE 6.

The Annexure hereto shall be regarded as an integral part of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 7.

This Treaty shall replace the Treaties of Alliance signed at Baghdad on the tenth day of October, One thousand nine hundred and twenty-two of the Christian Era, corresponding to the nineteenth day of Safar, One thousand three hundred and forty-one, Hijrah, and on the thirteenth day of January, One thousand nine hundred and twenty-six of the Christian Era, corresponding to the twenty-eighth day of Jamadi-al-Ukhra, One thousand three hundred and forty-four, Hijrah, and the subsidiary agreements thereto, which shall cease to have effect upon the entry into force of this Treaty. It shall be executed in duplicate, in the English and Arabic languages, of which the former shall be regarded as the authoritative version.

ARTICLE 8.

The High Contracting Parties recognise that, upon the entry into force of this Treaty, all responsibilities devolving under the Treaties and Agreements referred to in Article 7 hereof upon His Britannic Majesty in respect of 'Iraq will, in so far as His Britannic Majesty is concerned, then automatically and completely come to an end, and that such responsibilities, in so far as they continue at all, will devolve upon His Majesty the King of 'Iraq alone.

It is also recognised that all responsibilities devolving upon His Britannic Majesty in respect of 'Iraq under any other international instruments, in so far as they continue at all, should similarly devolve upon His Majesty the King of 'Iraq alone, and the High Contracting Parties shall immediately take such steps as may be necessary to secure the transference to His Majesty the King of 'Iraq of these responsibilities.

ARTICLE 9.

Nothing in the present Treaty is intended to or shall in any way prejudice the rights and obligations which devolve, or may devolve, upon either of the High Contracting Parties under the Covenant of the League of Nations or the Treaty for the Renunciation of War signed at Paris on the twenty-seventh day of August, One thousand nine hundred and twenty-eight.

ARTICLE 10.

Should any difference arise relative to the application or the interpretation of this Treaty, and should the High Contracting Parties fail to settle such difference by direct negotiation, then it shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 11.

This Treaty shall be ratified and ratifications shall be exchanged as soon as possible. Thereafter it shall come into force as soon as 'Iraq has been admitted to membership of the League of Nations.

The present Treaty shall remain in force for a period of twenty-five years from the date of its coming into force. At any time after twenty years from the date of the coming into force of this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties will, at the request of either of them, conclude a new Treaty which shall provide for the continued maintenance and protection in all circumstances of the essential communications of His Britannic Majesty. In case of disagreement in this matter the difference will be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations.

In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Baghdad in duplicate this thirtieth day of June, One thousand nine hundred and thirty, of the Christian Era, corresponding to the fourth day of Safar, One thousand three hundred and forty-nine, Hijrah.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.
NURI AL SA'ID.

ANNEXURE TO TREATY OF ALLIANCE.**1**

The strength of the forces maintained in 'Iraq by His Britannic Majesty, in accordance with the terms of Article 5 of this Treaty, shall be determined by His Britannic Majesty from time to time after consultation With His Majesty the King of 'Iraq.

His Britannic Majesty shall maintain forces at Hinaidi for a period of five year after the entry into force of this Treaty, in order to enable His Majesty the King of 'Iraq to organise the necessary forces to replace them. By the expiration of that period the said forces of His Britannic Majesty shall have been withdrawn from Hinaidi. It shall be also open to His Britannic Majesty to maintain forces at Mosul for a maximum period of five years from the entry into force of this Treaty. Thereafter it shall be open to His Britannic Majesty to station his forces in the localities mentioned in Article 5 of this Treaty, and His Majesty the King of 'Iraq will grant to His Britannic Majesty, for the duration of the Alliance, leases of the necessary sites for the accomodation of the forces of His Britannic Majesty in those localities.

2

Subject to any modifications which the two High Contracting Parties may agree to introduce in the future, the immunities and privileges in jurisdictional and fiscal matters, including freedom from taxation, enjoyed by the British forces in 'Iraq will continue to extend to the forces referred to in Clause 1 above and to such of His Britannic Majesty's forces of all arms as may be in 'Iraq in pursuance of the present Treaty and its Annexure or otherwise by agreement between the High Contracting Parties, and the existing provisions of any local legislation affecting the armed forces of His Britannic Majesty in 'Iraq shall also continue. The Iraq Government will take the necessary steps to ensure that the altered conditions will not render the position of the British forces as regards immunities and privileges in any way less favourable than that enjoyed by them at the entry into force of this Treaty.

3

His Majesty the King of 'Iraq agrees to provide all possible facilities for the movement, training and maintenance of the forces referred to in Clause 1 above, and to accord to those forces the same facilities for the use of wireless telegraphy as those enjoyed by them at the date of the entry into force of the present Treaty.

4

His Majesty the King of 'Iraq undertakes to provide, at the request and at the expense of His Britannic Majesty, and upon such conditions as may be agreed to between the High Contracting Parties, special guards from his own forces for the protection of such air bases as may, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, be occupied

by the forces of His Britannic Majesty, and to secure the enactment of such legislation as may be necessary for the fulfilment of the conditions referred to above.

5

His Britannic Majesty undertakes to grant, whenever they may be required by His Majesty the King of 'Iraq, all possible facilities in the following matters, the cost of which will be met by His Majesty the King of 'Iraq:—

- (1) Naval, military and aeronautical instruction of 'Iraqi Officers in the United Kingdom.
- (2) The provision of arms, ammunition, equipment, ships and aeroplanes of the latest available pattern for the forces of His Majesty the King of 'Iraq.
- (3) The provision of British Naval, military and air force officers to serve in an advisory capacity with the forces of His Majesty the King of 'Iraq.

6

In view of the desirability of identity in training and methods between the 'Iraq and British armies, His Majesty the King of 'Iraq undertakes that, should he deem it necessary to have recourse to foreign instructors, these shall be chosen amongst British subjects.

He further undertakes that any personnel of his forces that may be sent abroad for military training will be sent to military schools, colleges and training centres in the territories of His Britannic Majesty, provided that this shall not prevent him from sending to any other country such personnel as cannot be received in the said institutions and training centres.

He further undertakes that the armament and essential equipment of his forces shall not differ in type from those of the forces of His Britannic Majesty.

7

His Majesty the King of 'Iraq agrees to afford, when requested to do so by His Britannic Majesty, all possible facilities for the movement of the forces of His Britannic Majesty of all arms in transit across 'Iraq, and for the transport and storage of all supplies and equipment that may be required by these forces during their passage, across 'Iraq. These facilities shall cover the use of the roads, railways, waterways, ports and aerodromes of 'Iraq, and His Britannic Majesty's ships shall have general permission to visit the Shatt-al-Arab on the understanding that His Majesty the King of 'Iraq is given prior notification of visit to 'Iraq ports.

Appendix (I)**PALESTINE WHITE PAPER 1930****STATEMENT BY THE ACCREDITED REPRESENTATIVE TO
THE PERMANENT MANDATES COMMISSION.**

1. The Permanent Mandates Commission are aware of the circumstances in which a Special Commission, under the Chairmanship of Sir Walter Shaw, was appointed by the British Government in September last, "to enquire into the immediate causes which led to the recent outbreak in Palestine and make recommendations as to the steps necessary to avoid a recurrence." After an exhaustive investigation conducted on the spot, the Commission presented its report on March 12th, 1930. The report was published in Great Britain as a Parliamentary Paper at the beginning of April, and copies were at the same time forwarded to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations for distribution to members of the Permanent Mandates Commission

(2) Following upon the publication of the report, the Prime Minister of Great Britain made a statement in the following terms in the British House of Commons on April 3rd, 1930:

"His Majesty's Government will continue to administer Palestine in accordance with the terms of the mandate as approved by the Council of the League of Nations. That is an international obligation from which there can be no question of receding.

"Under the terms of the mandate, His Majesty's Government are responsible for promoting 'the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country'.

"A double undertaking is involved, to the Jewish people on the one hand, and to the non-Jewish population of Palestine on the other; and it is the firm resolve of His Majesty's Government to give effect, in equal measure, to both parts of the declaration, and to do equal justice to all sections of the populations of Palestine. That is a duty from which they will not shrink, and to the discharge of which they will apply all the resources at their command.

"The report of the Shaw Commission, which is in the hands of Honourable Members, covers a wide field. The Commission was appointed to consider the immediate causes of the deplorable disturbances of August last, and to suggest means of preventing a recurrence. In endeavouring faithfully to carry out the terms of reference, the Commission must have found it difficult to draw lines very rigidly. The Government is now studying the various

recommendations of the Commission, with a view to dealing with the immediate causes of the outbreak and to preventing a recurrence, and is in consultation with the interests concerned.

“I wish it to be understood that this statement includes the immediate provision of the forces required to secure civil peace under existing circumstances.”

3. His Majesty's Government have now given further consideration to the various conclusions and recommendations of the Commission of Enquiry. But, before proceeding to the discussion of details, they would wish to offer some preliminary observations of a more general nature. The difficulties arising out of the peculiar character of the Palestine Mandate are well known. There is no need to labour this aspect of the question, since it is one with which the Permanent Mandates Commission are already familiar. It was discussed in detail in the course of the observations recorded by the Commission (in November 1924) on the first report on the administration of Palestine that came under their examination. The Commission then remarked that, whereas all the other mandates the application of which they had hitherto examined were only intended to give effect to the general principles of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the mandate for Palestine was “of a more complex nature”, in that it imposed upon the mandatory Power a “two-fold duty”, viz, that of promoting the establishment of a National Home for the Jewish people, in addition to that of administering the country in conformity with the interests of the population as a whole. The result, as the Commission pointed out, was to create a “conflict of interests” between which the balance had to be held. The observations recorded by the Permanent Mandates Commission in November 1924 have lost none of their relevance at the present time. The conflict of interest remains, and the task of holding the balance has certainly not decreased in difficulty. The situation is one of great delicacy, calling for the exercise of all possible patience and circumspection. That it has certain unsatisfactory features, as is pointed out in the Report of the Commission of Enquiry, His Majesty's Government are not concerned to dispute. Rather, they are more concerned to provide a remedy; and to this task they mean to address themselves with all the resources at their disposal. They do not underrate the difficulties. The conditions under which remedial measures can be applied are strictly limited; they are governed by the terms of the mandate and by the dual obligation which it imposes. Such measures cannot be devised or introduced at a moment's notice. Caution is essential, and the ground must be carefully examined before an advance can safely be made. For these reasons, His Majesty's Government are not in a position to formulate precise and concrete proposals in regard to all the points that the Commission have raised. On some at least of these points they can do no more than indicate provisionally the lines on which they hope to proceed.

4. Turning to questions of detail, His Majesty's Government accept generally the findings of the Commission of Enquiry under the following five heads, viz.:

- (i) Nature of the outbreak (page 158) ;
- (ii) Zionist complaints against the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem (pages 158 and 159) ;
- (iii) Zionist complaints against the Palestine Arab Executive (page 159) ;
- (iv) Zionist complaints against the Government (pages 159 to 161) ; and
- (v) Minor Arab grievances (page 163).

His Majesty's Government do not consider that these conclusions in themselves call for special action on their part. It will be noted, in connection with (ii), that Mr. Snell, one of the three Commissioners, in his "Note of Reservations", has attributed to the Grand Mufti a greater share in the responsibility for disturbances than is attributed to him in the report, and has expressed the view that the Mufti must bear the blame for his failure to make any effort to control the character of an agitation conducted in the name of a religion, of which, in Palestine, he was the head (page 172). As to this, reference is invited to the statement made on page 77 of the Commission's report to the effect that, whatever activities he may have indulged in outside the knowledge of the Government, in public the Mufti, both at noon on August 23rd and thereafter throughout the period of the disturbances, exerted his influence in the direction of promoting peace and restoring order. On this point, the report states, there was an absolute unanimity of opinion among the many official witnesses with whom the question of the Mufti's conduct was raised during the course of the Commission's enquiry. Mr. Snell also dissents from the conclusions in the report "acquitting the Moslem religious authorities of all but the slightest blame for the innovations introduced in the neighbourhood of the Wailing Wall". On this point it is to be observed that the report (paragraph 7 on page 159) does not purport to assign any specific degree of blame to the Mohammedan authorities. The conclusion which it records is that "in the matter of innovations of practice, little blame can be attached to the Mufti in which some Jewish religious authorities also would not have to share". His Majesty's Government do not feel that they can usefully offer any further comments on this branch of the question.

5. It may be convenient to deal in one paragraph with two important economic questions which are closely interrelated, viz., those concerning immigration and the land problem. The conclusions and recommendations of the Commission of Enquiry on these questions appear on pages 161, 162, 165 and 166 of their report. Mr. Snell has also expressed certain views and has made supplementary recommendations with regard to these questions in his "Note of Reservation." It is in relation to these questions, and to that of immigration in particular, that the dual character of the mandate assumes its most significant aspect. This was recognised, in effect, by the Permanent Mandates Commission when, in the course of the Observations of November 1924, from which quotation has already been made, they selected the problem of immigration

("perhaps the dominant issue of the present situation in Palestine") as best illustrating their general exposition upon the operation of the mandate. The following passage from the observations states the problem so clearly that it may be quoted in full:

"It is obvious that, if the mandatory Power had only to take into consideration the interests of the population, its immigration policy ought to be dictated primarily by considerations of the economic needs of the country. It is, moreover, equally clear that, if the mandatory Power had not to take into account the interests of the Arab population, and if its sole duty was to encourage Jewish immigration in Palestine, it might be in a position to pursue an agrarian policy which would facilitate and expedite to a greater extent than its present policy the creation of a Jewish National Home."

That, stated succinctly, is the dilemma which has confronted, and still confronts, the mandatory Government. The policy which they have adopted, and which they had endeavoured to follow, is based upon the principle that immigration shall "not exceed the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals."

The soundness of this principle will hardly be challenged, but its practical application is not without difficulty. The absorptive capacity of the country must be correctly gauged; everything turns upon that. But, to gauge it correctly, many intricate considerations of land settlement, development, etc., must be taken into account; and the margin for miscalculation is necessarily wide. If there have been mistakes in the past, they must be avoided in future. But the question is too important, and too vital to the prosperity of Palestine, to be tackled hastily or without due consideration. His Majesty's Government have felt unable to formulate specific proposals without further expert examination of the whole problem in all its aspects. A highly qualified investigator has accordingly been appointed to proceed to Palestine on a temporary mission, in order to confer with the High Commissioner and report to His Majesty's Government on land settlement, immigration, and development. For this mission Sir John Hope Simpson, who is employed under the League of Nations as Vice-Chairman of the Refugee Settlement Commission in Greece, has been selected. He is now on his way to Palestine. The whole question of future policy in regard to immigration, land settlement and development will be considered and determined on receipt of Sir J. Hope Simpson's report. In the meantime, temporary measures are being taken with a view to safeguarding the position of certain elements in the population of Palestine. The question of a temporary suspension of immigration is under examination; and legislation is to be introduced with the object of controlling the disposition of agricultural lands in such manner as to prevent the dispossession of the indigenous agricultural population. These temporary measures will be superseded in any case by such permanent enactments as may be decided upon when future policy is determined in the light of Sir J. Hope Simpson's report.

6. His Majesty's Government are also making enquiries with regard to the statement on page 161 of the report (paragraph 30) that the selection of immigrants under the labour schedule ought to be entrusted to the General Federation of Jewish Labour in Palestine. They are, further, in consultation with the High Commissioner for Palestine regarding the question, referred to at (c) on page 166 of the Commission's report, of providing credit facilities for Palestinian agriculturists.

7. On the important subject of constitutional development, the Commission of Enquiry have made no formal recommendation, beyond urging that, when the question again comes under review, regard should be had to their conclusion that the absence of any measure of self-government greatly aggravated the difficulties of the local administration. This is a question in which the Permanent Mandates Commission have from the first displayed an active interest. In their original observations of November 1924, they expressed their appreciation of "the persistent efforts of the High Commissioner to secure the co-operation of the Arab majority in the central administration of the country." A year later, in October 1925, they expressed the hope that "an extension of co-operation, particularly in the conduct of municipal and district affairs", might become possible in the near future. Further references to the subject appeared in the Commission's "Observations" both of June 1926 and of July 1927. The position, stated quite briefly, is as follows: The questions of "self-governing institutions" and of "local autonomy" are dealt with in Articles 2 and 3 respectively of the Palestine Mandate. Article 2 makes the Mandatory responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economical conditions as will secure (inter alia) "the development of self-governing institutions." Article 3 required the Mandatory, so far as circumstances permit, to encourage local autonomy. The steps taken for the establishment of municipal and local councils in Palestine are well known to the Commission. Nor is it necessary to refer in detail to the attempts that have been made in the past to introduce a measure of self-government for the country as a whole. These attempts are fully described in the report of the Commission of Enquiry. It will be apparent that the absence of any such measure of self-government in Palestine is not due to any lack of goodwill on the part of the mandatory Power. It must be a primary condition of any constitutional change in Palestine that the mandatory Government should reserve to itself the power of carrying out the obligations imposed upon it by the mandate. The question formed the subject of conversation with the delegation of Palestinian Arabs which lately came to England for the purpose of representing their views on future policy in Palestine. It has been made clear to the delegation that no measure of self-government could be considered which was not compatible with the requirements of the mandate. The matter is, of course, one which also deeply concerns the Jewish Agency.

8. On page 163 of the report, the Commission expressed certain views on the difficulties inherent in the mandate. Their recommendations on this point, as recorded on pages 164 and 165, include the issue of a clear statement of policy:

(1) Containing a definition in clear and positive terms of the meaning which His Majesty's Government attach to the passages in the mandate for the safeguarding of the rights of the non-Jewish community in Palestine, and

(2) Laying down, for the guidance of the Government of Palestine, directions more explicit than any that have yet been given as to the conduct of policy on such vital issues as land and immigration.

The statement of British policy in Palestine, of which a copy is reproduced on pages 196 to 199 of the report of the Commission, was issued in 1922. The administration of the country has since been conducted on the general lines laid down in that statement, except that, for reasons already explained, the proposed Legislative Council has never been brought into being. His Majesty's Government do not challenge the view that a further and more explicit statement of policy is required; and it is their intention in due course to issue such a statement. Since, however, no such statement could be adequate or complete which ignored the vital questions of land settlement, immigration and development, it will be necessary to await the report of Sir J. Hope Simpson before giving effect to the Commission's recommendation. Their further recommendations relating to the functions of the Zionist Organisation and to the Palestine Zionist Executive (page 167 of the report) will also be adopted when the proposed statement is drawn up

9. As regards defence and security, the Commission, on page 163 of their report, have expressed the view that the policy of reducing the garrison in Palestine and Trans-Jordan was carried too far. In this connection, the remarks made on page 157 of the report should be borne in mind. As is there admitted, the presence of troops or of British police in larger numbers on August 23rd, 1929, would not necessarily have prevented an outbreak. The experience of April 1920 and May 1921, when racial disturbances occurred—despite the strength of the garrison—points the other way. His Majesty's Government have at present under their earnest consideration the question of the composition and strength of the garrison to be retained in Palestine in the future. In the meantime, they do not propose to disturb the existing garrison of two battalions of infantry plus units of the Royal Air Force. Arrangements have also been made with a view of ensuring the despatch of reinforcements to Palestine with the least possible delay if need should arise. As regard the police, effect has already been given to recommendation (c) on page 168 of the Commission's report, that an independent enquiry should be made by an experienced police officer from some other dependency into the organisation of the Department of Police in Palestine. The officer selected for this enquiry, Mr. H. L. Dowbiggin, Inspector of Police, Ceylon, arrived in Palestine in January, and his final report is expected shortly. In the meantime, an additional 400 British police have been recruited for Palestine, and steps have been taken to increase the mobility of the British police. Mr. Dowbiggin has presented an ad interim report on the specific subject of the protection of outlying Jewish colonies; and action is being taken on the lines recommended by him. A further increase

in the number of British and Palestine police is involved, and a scheme of defence, including the establishment and control of sealed armouries, is being brought into force. His Majesty's Government are fully satisfied as to the need for sealed armouries; without them, the adequate defence of the colonies can be ensured only at a prohibitive cost. The question of improving the intelligence service and of forming a reserve of special constables, which formed the subject of the recommendations in paragraph 53 on page 167 and paragraph 55 (*d*) on page 168, are being taken up with the High Commissioner for Palestine

10. With regard to the recommendation in paragraph 50 on page 166, the Permanent Mandates Commission are no doubt aware that the Council of the League have approved of the appointment of a Commission to define and determine Jewish and Moslem rites at the western or Wailing Wall

11. There remain the recommendations in paragraph 52 on page 167 under the heading "Press Incitement". The High Commissioner has at present under consideration the enactment of legislation to provide for the better control of the Press. The suggestion made in paragraph 52 (*b*) will be duly considered in this connection. The High Commissioner's attention will also be drawn to the remarks on Press incitement included in the "Note of Reservations" by Mr Snell (page 181).

May 1930.

Appendix (J)

SPEECH BY GENERAL NURI as-SA'ID AT THE PALESTINE CONFERENCE

February 13, 1939.

H.E. General NURI as-Sa'id: Mr. MacDonald, Your Royal Highnesses, Your Excellencies and Gentlemen, this Conference has been summoned at this juncture in view of the present tragic situation in Palestine. The British Government, in order to find a solution, has decided to consult all Arab States, and we representatives of Arab States cannot but be grateful to Great Britain for recognising that we are equally interested with her in finding a way to settle the Palestine impasse.

But I cannot help feeling that it is most unfortunate that this Conference has to be held at a time when the Jews of Europe are suffering such unparalleled misfortune. When England, Holland, France and America are endeavouring to find places of refuge for the unfortunate Jews who are being expelled from European countries it is particularly unfortunate that the Arabs should have to resist their further entry into Palestine. Ever since the Arabs became an Empire and a ruling race the Jews have been guaranteed protection within their dominions. When Christendom rejected the Jews Islam sheltered them. It is exceedingly unfortunate that at this miserable period in Jewish history the Arabs, of all people, should appear to be intolerant.

As a representative of a State in which Jews are equal citizens with Arabs I do not want the present unfortunate state of the Jews in Europe to be used as a reason for denying justice to the Arabs, who have never in all their history been intolerant towards the Jews.

The interest which the Government of Iraq takes in the settlement of the present dispute in Palestine is very real and lively. Not only is she a close neighbour of Palestine but until the post-war policy was initiated in that country the composition of her population was not dissimilar. Both countries are predominantly Arab in character and both contain large Jewish communities. Both formed part of the pre-war Ottoman Empire and were governed by the same laws. Their culture, customs and local institutions are almost identical. So I must preface my remarks with some observations on the position of the Jews in the pre-war Ottoman Empire and in Iraq up to the present day. Throughout the Ottoman Empire were scattered numerous Jewish communities whose numbers were estimated at 800,000 in 1912. They were mostly centred in the towns but a few agricultural communities did exist. Many of the communities were large ones, that in Iraq amounting to 70,000. These Jews were organised as a community (millet), and were race-conscious, maintaining their religion, their language and their racial purity. Though the Zionist movement existed before the war in Europe, we in the Ottoman Empire, though aware of its existence,

regarded it as a spiritual symbolic movement quite unassociated with politics. There was certainly no movement of Jews from within the Ottoman Empire to Palestine. The Jews were very contented, prosperous subjects of the Ottoman Empire, and happy to remain in the various provinces which had sheltered them for centuries. Ottoman Jews had no sympathy with Zionism and such migration as did take place was to such centres as Bombay, Calcutta, Shanghai and London, in all of which places Jews from Baghdad and other parts of the Ottoman Empire established large and prosperous business houses. No Jews from Iraq or other parts of the Ottoman Empire ever went to Palestine to settle. Palestine was not regarded by the Jews in other parts of the Ottoman Empire as a particularly desirable place in which to settle or a land to which they must return.

The Jews, moreover, identified themselves very much with the life of the district in which they lived. For example, those in Iraq would consider themselves Iraqi Jews and as much concerned with the life of the Arabs who surrounded them, and with whom they had daily contacts, as with Jewry in other parts of the Ottoman Empire.

As far as Iraqi Jews are concerned the situation has continued very much the same since the close of the Great War. Iraq has nearly 100,000 Jews, half of them in Baghdad itself. They are a wealthy and contented community who play a very great part in the commercial life of Iraq. A large number are Government officials; and certain departments, such as finance, railways and the Port of Basrah, are very largely staffed by them. Under Iraq law they are equal citizens with Mohammedans and Christians, although they retain the right to have their own religious courts for some matters of personal status. This is in accordance with traditional Arab practice, which has always been tolerant. Good relations between Jews and Arabs have existed for centuries in Iraq, and have only become changed, unfortunately, in the last few years. The maintenance of these good relations is the anxious concern of the Iraqi Government.

But the growth of Zionism and the Zionist policy pursued in Palestine have from time to time aroused feelings which have threatened to affect these good relations between the Arabs and Jews in Iraq.

The first outward sign of this changed feeling was shown when the late Lord Melchett, then Sir Alfred Mond, visited Baghdad. But even then there was no feeling exhibited against the Jews as Jews.—only a real hostility to political Zionism.

Some years ago the Iraqis learnt with considerable surprise that Sir Henry Dobbs, when High Commissioner for Iraq, had, presumably on instructions received from England, summoned the leading Jews of Baghdad and asked them to accept a branch of the Jewish Agency in Baghdad. As this was a Zionist body the Iraqi Jews absolutely refused to be associated with such a branch, and eventually convinced Sir Henry Dobbs that the Agency could not possibly be allowed to be established in Baghdad. This official effort to force Iraqi Jews to become Zionists only became known to the Iraqi authorities some

years later. The important point to note is that the Jews of Iraq did not want to be associated with Zionism. To-day, as Prime Minister of Iraq, I can confidently assert that I come here not only to represent the Arabs of Iraq but equally the Jews of Iraq, whose interests are identical with those of the Arabs

In 1929, following the Wailing Wall disturbances in Palestine, attempts were made by Arab sympathisers in Baghdad to hold demonstrations. The Iraq Government broke up these demonstrations by force and the friendly relations between Jews and Arabs continued to all outward appearance. But there was a growing feeling that events in Palestine were affecting public opinion in Iraq. From that time onwards a greater interest was evinced by Iraqis in Palestine affairs.

In the last few years the position has unfortunately deteriorated considerably. The repressive policy adopted in Palestine, the throwing of bombs by Jews in Haifa and Jerusalem and the disorders and open rebellion in Palestine that followed, have roused Arab sentiment in Iraq. Fortunately there have been no serious attacks on Jews. It is true that a few bombs have been thrown in the Jewish quarter and in Jewish clubs in Baghdad, but there has been no loss of life. The Iraq Government will, of course, not tolerate any form of pogrom.

But the situation in Palestine has caused repercussions in Iraq which are a source of great anxiety to the Government, which finds that the traditional harmonious relations between its Jewish and Arab subjects are being violently disturbed by policies and actions occurring outside the frontiers of Iraq and not under the control of the Iraq Government or of the Iraq Jews or the Iraq Arabs.

If there is no immediate settlement of the Palestine problem, we fear that the ill-feeling which now exists between Jews and Arabs in Palestine will spread into Iraq and become a menace to the peace of the country. It will seriously affect the prosperity of the Iraqi Jews and embarrass the Iraqi Government, which is very jealous of its reputation for toleration and justice to all classes and sects. Should such a situation occur in Iraq as has occurred in Palestine, with Jews and Arabs attacking each other, it will be a tragedy, as both the Iraqi Jews and the Iraqi Arabs are completely innocent in the matter, having originally no quarrel whatsoever. Are they to be the victims of Zionist policy pursued elsewhere?

That this apprehension of the Iraq Government is not without foundation is proved by events in Syria. I regret that, for reasons into which I need not enter, Syria is not represented at this Conference. But the sentiments of the Arabs of Syria are fortunately widely known, and in any case as Arabs they must feel as their fellow Arabs do throughout the Middle East. Though they are absent in the flesh, their spirit still animates us. In 1925 the late Lord Balfour visited Damascus. Large demonstrations protesting against the British policy in Palestine took place in Damascus and Beyrouth, shops were closed and a day of mourning proclaimed. Since that date, every year, there have been similar mass demonstrations in all the cities of Syria and the Lebanon, the last taking place in November, 1938.

These demonstrations have taken place although Syria and the Lebanon are under the control of the French Government. They have served to keep alive ill-feeling against the Jews. We in Iraq have not allowed anti-Jewish demonstrations; we have done everything in our power to allay the growing resentment of Iraqi Arabs against the Jews. We cannot, however, say what the future will bring.

From the foregoing it will be appreciated that the Government of Iraq is compelled to take a lively interest in the Palestine situation, as it affects so closely the maintenance of law and order in Iraq itself.

As the Palestinian question is judged in Iraq there are, however, other pertinent points to be kept in mind. Iraq cannot forget the promises made to King Hussein by Sir Henry McMahon. These promises were made on behalf of the British Government in the course of the Great War, and have not been repudiated by Great Britain. The letters signed by Sir Henry McMahon were in Arabic and their meaning is perfectly clear. From the Arabic text it is evident that Palestine was included in the area that was promised to the Arabs.

These promises were made to King Hussein and the Arabs in Arabic alone, and therefore the Arabic text must be the dominating text. On the strength of these promises made in Arabic by Sir Henry McMahon on behalf of Great Britain, King Hussein and his sons, with the aid of the British, commenced not only armed hostilities against the Turks but a sustained propaganda among the Arabs of Syria and Palestine and promised them that Palestine would form part of the future Arab State. These promises of King Hussein to the Arabs of Palestine were made with the full knowledge of the British Higher Command, who in fact arranged for the pamphlets to be distributed by aeroplane in Palestine. The pamphlet, moreover, contained an assurance that they were issued with the authority of General Allenby.

Great Britain has stated that as one of the parties to the correspondence she must be the interpreter of what she intended in the correspondence. Mr. MacDonald in the Conference on Saturday stated that Palestine had always been regarded by Great Britain as excluded from the area of the Arab countries whose independence Great Britain would acknowledge. He further said that Sir Henry McMahon had himself declared that he also had never intended to include Palestine in that area.

But in the vital letter which Sir Henry McMahon wrote to King Hussein on October 24th, 1915, he expressly stated that he had referred the matter of boundaries to the Government of Great Britain and that on behalf of that Government he was communicating the statement regarding boundaries which the letter contained. Therefore the opinion of Sir Henry McMahon twenty-two years later has no legal or other value, as he was merely the medium of communication adopted by the British Government.

When there is a dispute between two parties over the interpretation of a document the principle of interpretation adopted in the English courts is to take the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words used in the document. If these are clear the intentions of the parties are not considered unless there is strong proof that a word or phrase was used by both parties in some special sense agreed upon by both, or at any rate known to both.

An examination of the words employed in this crucial letter of Sir Henry McMahon makes it clear that Palestine was not excluded. The other letters all bear this out. As the Palestine Delegation have prepared a detailed statement on this point with the full legal argument, there is no need for me to say more here.

King Hussein and the Arabs entered the war on the side of the Allies, relying on the definite promises of the British Government to acknowledge an independent Arab State which would include Palestine. They recognised that Great Britain had made reservations in respect of Beyrouth and the Lebanon, but King Hussein made it clear in his letters to Sir Henry McMahon that, while for the moment, in order not to embarrass Great Britain in her relations with France, the Arabs would not create difficulties, yet at the conclusion of the war they would claim even Beyrouth and the northern coastal regions from Great Britain.

Throughout the operations that followed, with the close cooperation that existed between British military and political officers and the Arab leaders, these promises were frequently discussed, both formally and informally. It was never suggested that Palestine should be excluded. Indeed, the contrary was the case. British officers attached to the Shereefian forces and the officers of Lord Allenby's staff with whom the Arabs came in contact all acted on the assumption that Palestine was to be part of the future Arab State.

All Arab representatives from 1918 to the present day have never ceased to claim from Great Britain the carrying out of the specific pledge made by Sir Henry McMahon. King Feisal seized every opportunity to press upon the British Government the satisfaction of the claim of the Palestinian Arabs for inclusion in an Arab State.

In 1919 I was with the Emir Feisal in London when he took up this matter vigorously with the late Lord Curzon in the presence of Sir Hurbert Young, who is now in England and available for consultation. The Emir Feisal claimed the fulfilment of the promises made by Great Britain to his father and specifically claimed the inclusion of Palestine in the Arab State. In view of the Amir's insistence that the McMahon correspondence included Palestine Lord Curzon had the original correspondence brought from Cairo to be examined. The result of this examination was not communicated to us, but we felt that there must have been discovered some discrepancy between the Arabic and English texts to account for Lord Curzon's silence. But we Arabs cannot be held responsible for any such discrepancy. The British undertakings to us must be examined in the light of the text in which they were made to us, that is to say the Arabic text.

We ask the British Government to go into this matter of the exact promises made to King Hussein and the Arabs in the Arabic letters sent by the British Government through Sir Henry McMahon. We do not ask for the publication of the English documents, as we have never seen them and did not rely upon them. So the difficulty mentioned by Mr. MacDonald at Saturday's meeting about the publication of secret State documents does not really arise, as the Arabic documents upon which we rely have already been made public.

Why was this explicit promise not carried out? The reason, as far as we can see, is the existence of the Balfour Declaration of 1917. In this Declaration it was stated: "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country".

This is the only promise made to the Jews by Great Britain that we are aware of. It was made without consulting King Hussein or any of the Arab leaders. It cannot therefore be regarded as in any way binding the Arabs. In our view it is not an undertaking which should be allowed to obstruct or delay the fulfilment of the prior pledges made to the Arabs, but from the very moment of its publication it has in fact affected the interpretation of the undertaking given to the Arabs by Great Britain in 1915.

In 1916 Arab officers and men who had served in the Turkish Army volunteered for service in the forces of King Hussein, relying on the promises made by Great Britain in the McMahon correspondence to create an Arab State which would include Palestine. The regular contingents of trained troops were almost entirely composed of Palestinians Syrians and Iraqis, and they bore the brunt of the fighting.

When we in this Army heard of the Balfour Declaration at the end of 1917 we were near Aqaba, and the news caused consternation throughout the whole of the Arab force. We took counsel together and declared that we must abandon the fight for Arab independence in co-operation with the forces of Great Britain until we received assurances that the McMahon pledges would be carried out. King Hussein had already protested against the Balfour Declaration, and in January 1918 received from Commander Hogarth of the Arab Bureau, who had been sent by His Majesty's Government to Jedda, specific assurances that the Balfour Declaration would not conflict with the political and economic freedom promised to the Arabs in the McMahon correspondence. He was further assured by His Majesty's Government through Commander Hogarth that the Balfour Declaration envisaged no more than a restricted settlement of Jews in Palestine for spiritual and cultural reasons, and that no Jewish State was contemplated. King Hussein communicated these assurances to the Arab forces who in consequence continued to fight side by side with the British.

A similar Declaration was made to Arab leaders in Cairo in June 1918 in an official statement issued on the authority of the Foreign Office and known as "the Declaration to the Seven". In this statement His Majesty's Government promised that the future government of Palestine would be based upon the principle "of the consent of the governed."

In view of these explanations the Arabs for the remainder of the war prosecuted their campaign against the Turks, confident that at the conclusion of hostilities Palestine would be a part of the Arab State. Haji Amin al Husseini, the present Grand Mufti, actively recruited volunteers in Palestine from among the Arabs to join the forces of King Feisal. He openly promised them that Palestine would be part of the Arab State, and these promises were known to the British Officers, who actively assisted him in his efforts to recruit Palestinian Arabs. All the British officers with whom the Arabs fighting in the Hejaz, Palestine and Syria came in contact shared their views, and though Zionist propaganda in Europe and America was, as we now know, giving a totally different interpretation of the Balfour Declaration, the Arabs were encouraged by Great Britain to believe that Palestine would in future enjoy self-government as part of the Arab State. The Anglo-French Declaration of November 1918 did nothing to disabuse them of this belief. After the Armistice, when Zionist aspirations became known, Arab alarm was revived. The Arab leaders themselves were fully employed consolidating the positions captured in Syria against any possible recurrence of the war and in creating an Arab State in Syria. They were content to leave the administration of Palestine temporarily in the hands of their Allies, the British, whom they still trusted to carry out their promises in respect to Palestine when peace should be finally declared.

At the Peace conference, however, they discovered for the first time that the British Government were prepared to give the Jews a far different "National Home" in Palestine than the British Government had explained to the Arabs. This led to the conversations between the late King Feisal and Lord Curzon in 1919 to which I have already referred. That this Arab view of the meaning attached to the Balfour Declaration at the time it was made in 1917 is correct, is confirmed by the "Statement of Policy in Palestine" issued by the Colonial Office in 1922 which defines "The Jewish National Home" as "a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride". The Jews were to be allowed to establish in Palestine a religious and cultural centre and not a political state embracing all Palestine and to be populated by mass immigration of Jews to the eventual exclusion of all Arabs.

But though the Colonial Office, in 1922, gave this definition of the National Home, the British Government had in that year accepted from the League of Nations the Palestinian Mandate, a document which the British and Zionists had jointly drafted and which contemplated the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish National Home of a totally different kind. From 1919 the Arab leaders and the people of Palestine had viewed with alarm the growing Zionist pretensions. They had protested repeatedly against them but were

always told to wait until the League of Nations decided what the future of Palestine was to be. When the Mandate was proclaimed and their worst fears justified they refused all co-operation with Great Britain, feeling that they had been betrayed. They could not possibly accept any offer by Great Britain of palliatives such as mock legislative councils until their basic claims under the McMahon promises were admitted and accepted by Great Britain without qualification.

In consequence the Arabs have consistently refused to recognise the Mandate for Palestine. For several years, however, opposition in Palestine, though active, was not violent, and Great Britain had a chance to set up self-governing institutions had she so desired. But the administration of Palestine by Great Britain was not even in accordance with the Mandate. Article 2 of the Mandate, which is the most important article, imposes two equal duties upon the Mandatory: first, the establishment of the Jewish National Home, and secondly, the development of self-governing institutions. Other articles impose other duties, but they are only designed to further these two objects. One of these secondary duties is that of facilitating Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and without prejudice to the rights and position of other sections of the population.

During the past eighteen years the Mandatory Power has encouraged Jewish immigration to the maximum degree possible and in every manner, natural and artificial. Moreover, the Jewish Agency, the official body set up to co-operate with the Government on this and other matters, has admitted conniving at the entry into Palestine of even those Jews whose entry into Palestine was considered undesirable and whom the regulations of the Government did not allow to enter. In addition to encouraging Jewish immigration, the Government of Palestine has faithfully carried out the obligations to secure the establishment of the Jewish Nation Home. Hebrew has become an official language and large numbers of foreign Jews with no Palestinian status have been employed in the Government services. Zionist bodies have been allowed to acquire large tracts of land and to control the sources of minerals and of electric power, no option being allowed either to Arabs or the Palestine administration to share in the resources of their country.

As a result, during the past eighteen years over 300,000 Jews have migrated to Palestine—that small country. We want to know when, if ever, this immigration will cease. Do the British promises to the Jews entail a continuous, never-ending stream of Jewish immigrants into Palestine? At what date will the promises made to the Jews in the Balfour Declaration come to an end? Jewish immigration, according to the Mandate, should be conditioned by the rights and position of other sections of the population of Palestine. According to the reports of the Shaw Commission, and the Hope-Simpson Inquiry, the economic capacity of Palestine to absorb further immigrants came to an end in 1930.

But nothing has been done to further the second objective laid down in Article 2 of the Mandate—the development of self-governing institutions. The Palestinian Arabs have not been given any share in the government of their own country. No institutions have been

set up to prepare them for self-government. They are farther from the ideal of self-government now than they were in 1920. For eighteen years they have been ruled by a peculiar combination of Crown Colony Government and Zionism co-operating very closely, to the total exclusion of Arabs. All this has gone on notwithstanding the fact that in the Passfield White Paper it was declared: "It is the considered opinion of His Majesty's Government that the time has now come when the important question of the establishment of a measure of self-government in Palestine must, in the interest of the community as a whole, be taken in hand without further delay." The Passfield White Paper sets forth the advantages to be gained by the development of self-governing institutions, but the Zionists were hostile to any effort on the part of the Mandatory Power to carry out this duty of promoting self-governing institutions in spite of the fact that this duty was laid down in Article 2 of the Mandate and was of equal importance with that of creating a Jewish National Home. Zionist policy was naturally animated by a desire to delay the promotion of self-governing institutions in Palestine until the day when, by intensive mass immigration of Jews, they had established in Palestine sufficient Jews to outnumber the Arabs.

In 1930, following the reports of the Shaw Commission and the Hope-Simpson Inquiry, Lord Passfield, then Colonial Secretary, issued a White Paper in which he accepted many of the Arab claims and proposed what amounted to a new policy in Palestine. Though it did not meet all the Arab demands it roused their hopes that a new era would open in Palestine. Unfortunately, Zionist agitation and political pressure in England compelled the Prime Minister to give public assurances to the Zionist leader, Dr. Weizsmann, that British policy in Palestine would not be radically changed. This letter to Dr. Weizsmann of February 1931, though laid before the House of Commons, has not the status of a Command Paper, and the late Mr. Ramsay MacDonald was particularly anxious that the letter should not have the same status as the dominating document—the Passfield White Paper. But in the result British policy in Palestine continued unchanged, and in consequence the Arabs have been compelled to regard this letter as the ruling declaration of British policy.

Since that date the Arabs of Palestine have been in despair. Convinced that no report of any Commission that was favourable to the Arab claims would be acted upon by Great Britain, the Arabs of Palestine felt that it was impossible any longer to work with the Mandatory Power.

This failure of the Mandatory Power to fulfil the specific duty imposed by the Mandate to promote self-governing institutions has, in the opinion of all Arabs, led to the present breakdown in the administration of the country. In the White Paper Lord Passfield asserted that it is a primary duty of the Administration to ensure peace, order and good government in Palestine. This elementary duty the Mandatory Power has failed to do. Her policy has alienated the goodwill of the Arab majority and open rebellion has resulted. The civil authorities have had to call in the aid of the military and air forces to hold down the country and the ordinary liberties of the subjects have been suspended.

We in Iraq, who have been treated by Great Britain in such a different manner, who were given a large measure of self-government in 1924, cannot understand why Great Britain will not treat our brother Arabs in Palestine with equal generosity and equal justice. We were given the task of maintaining order ourselves, of developing the resources of our own country in our own way, and of building up a new state on modern lines. We ourselves had to create parliamentary institutions, so that eventually, with your constant aid and assistance, we gained complete independence and recognition as such from the nations of the world. Nobody will deny that British policy in Iraq has intensified the good relations which have existed between Arabs and English for centuries. Iraq has benefited, because there are many things that can be done by a people governing themselves which cannot be done for them by any other State, however well intentioned. British interests have certainly not suffered, because friendship is the best foundation for all relationships, whether political or economic.

It is not surprising, therefore, that we in Iraq feel that the introduction of a similar policy in Palestine, a country so similar to Iraq, would have the same beneficial effects. We hold that the Palestinians were promised by the British Government, through Sir Henry McMahon, the same self-government that has been granted to us in Iraq, and that the undertaking made to the Arab world in the Anglo-French agreement of November 1918, that the objects of France and England were to liberate the peoples and to establish a national government and administration drawing their authority from the initiative and free choice of the people was addressed also to the people of Palestine.

On several occasions during the past year Mr. Chamberlain, the Prime Minister, has declared that Great Britain is prepared to discuss any alleged injustice contained in the Peace Treaties and to endeavour to remedy it by free negotiation and in a spirit of conciliation and appeasement. Consequently we in Iraq are convinced that he will not refuse our request for justice in the matter of Palestine, and that in view of the tragic situation that has prevailed there for the past two years, he will agree that now is the time to reconsider British policy for that country.

We are certain that Palestine can only be pacified and a future peace ensured by the grant to Palestine of self-government.

In all that I have said I beseech you to remember that I speak as a sincere friend of Great Britain. I am, I think, the only man here present who, under the command of King Hussein and his sons, led forces in the field in active co-operation with the forces of Great Britain during the Great War. I would not willingly say one word which would wound the feelings of any Briton, as I know them to be at heart my friends. If anything I have said is felt to be too strong, my excuse is that I feel I must tell you how your policy is regarded in Arab countries.

In conclusion, and in the spirit of a life-long friend and admirer of Great Britain, I must make it clear that this Conference is being closely watched by all Arabs and all Muslims throughout the world.

Expectations have been roused by it. It must not fail.

Appendix (K)**1939 White Paper****H. B. M. G.'s STATEMENT OF POLICY. ON
PALESTINE 1939.**

In the Statement on Palestine, issued on November 9th 1938, His Majesty's Government announced their intention to invite representatives of the Arabs of Palestine, of certain neighbouring countries and of the Jewish Agency to confer with them in London regarding future policy. It was their sincere hope that, as a result of full, free and frank discussion, some understanding might be reached. Conferences recently took place with Arab and Jewish delegations, lasting for a period of several weeks, and served the purpose of a complete exchange of views between British Ministers and the Arab and Jewish representatives. In the light of the discussions as well as of the situation in Palestine and of the reports of the Royal Commission and the Partition Commission, certain proposals were formulated by His Majesty's Government and were laid before the Arab and Jewish delegations as the basis of an agreed settlement. Neither the Arab nor the Jewish delegations felt able to accept these proposals, and the conferences therefore did not result in an agreement. Accordingly, His Majesty's Government are free to formulate their own policy, and after careful consideration they have decided to adhere generally to the proposals which were finally submitted to, and discussed with, the Arab and Jewish delegations.

(2) The mandate for Palestine, the terms of which were confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations in 1922, has governed the policy of successive British Governments for nearly twenty years. It embodies the Balfour Declaration and imposes on the Mandatory four main obligations. These obligations are set out in Articles 2, 6 and 13 of the mandate. There is no dispute regarding the interpretation of one of these obligations, that touching the protection of and access to the holy places and religious buildings or sites. The other three main obligations are generally as follows:—

- (i) To place the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment in Palestine of a National home for the Jewish people, to facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions, and to encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish Agency, close settlement by Jews on the land.
- (ii) To safeguard the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine irrespective of race and religion, and, whilst facilitating Jewish immigration and settlement, to ensure that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced.

- (iii) To place the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the development of self-governing institutions.

(3) The Royal Commission and previous Commissions of Enquiry have drawn attention to the ambiguity of certain expressions in the mandate, such as the expression "a national home for the Jewish people", and they have found in this ambiguity and the resulting uncertainty as to the objectives of policy a fundamental cause of unrest and hostility between Arabs and Jews. His Majesty's Government are convinced that, in the interests of the peace and well-being of the whole people of Palestine, a clear definition of policy and objectives is essential. The proposal of partition recommended by the Royal Commission would have afforded such clarity, but the establishment of self-supporting independent Arab and Jewish States within Palestine has been found to be impracticable. It has therefore been necessary for His Majesty's Government to devise an alternative policy which will, consistently with their obligations to Arabs and Jews, meet the needs of the situation in Palestine. Their views and proposals are set forth below under the three heads, (I) The Constitution, (II) Immigration, and (III) Land.

I. THE CONSTITUTION.

4. It has been urged that the expression "a national home for the Jewish people" offered a prospect that Palestine might in due course become a Jewish State or Commonwealth. His Majesty's Government do not wish to contest the view, which was expressed by the Royal Commission, that the Zionist leaders at the time of the issue of the Balfour Declaration recognised that an ultimate Jewish State was not precluded by the terms of the Declaration. But, with the Royal Commission, His Majesty's Government believe that the framers of the mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab population of the country. That Palestine was not to be converted into a Jewish State might be held to be implied in the passage from the Command Paper of 1922 which reads as follows:

"Unauthorised statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that 'Palestine is to become as Jewish as England is English'. His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated...the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the (Balfour) Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine."

But this statement has not removed doubts, and His Majesty's Government therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State. They would indeed regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the mandate, as well as to the assurances which have been given to the Arab people in the past, that the Arab population of Palestine should be made the subjects of a Jewish State against their will.

5. The nature of the Jewish National Home in Palestine was further described in the Command Paper of 1922 as follows:—

“During the last two or three generations, the Jews have created in Palestine a community, now numbering 80,000, of whom about one-fourth are farmers or workers upon the land. This community has its own political organs; an elected assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns; elected councils in the towns; and an organisation for the control of its schools. It has its elected Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical Council for the direction of its religious affairs. Its business is conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular language, and a Hebrew Press serves its needs. It has its distinctive intellectual life and displays considerable economic activity. This community, then, with its town and country population, its political, religious and social organisations, its own language, its own customs, its own life, has in fact ‘national’ characteristics. When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognised to rest upon ancient historic connection.”

6. His Majesty's Government adhere to this interpretation of the Declaration of 1917 and regard it as an authoritative and comprehensive description of the character of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. It envisaged the further development of the existing Jewish community with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world. Evidence that His Majesty's Government have been carrying out their obligation in this respect is to be found in the facts that, since the statement of 1922 was published, more than 300,000 Jews have immigrated to Palestine, and that the population of the National Home has risen to some 450,000, or approaching a

third of the entire population of the country. Nor has the Jewish community failed to take advantage of the opportunities given to it. The growth of the Jewish National Home and its achievements in many fields are a remarkable constructive effort which must command the admiration of the world and must be, in particular, a source of pride to the Jewish people.

7. In the recent discussions, the Arab delegations have repeated the contention that Palestine was included with the area in which Sir Henry McMahon, on behalf of the British Government, in October 1915, undertook to recognise and support Arab independence. The validity of this claim, based on the terms of the correspondence which passed between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca, was thoroughly and carefully investigated by British and Arab representatives during the recent conferences in London. Their report, which has been published, states that both the Arab and the British representatives endeavoured to understand the point of view of the other party, but that they were unable to reach agreement upon an interpretation of the correspondence. There is no need to summarise here the arguments presented by each side. His Majesty's Government regret the misunderstandings which have arisen as regards some of the phrases used. For their part, they can only adhere, for the reasons given by their representatives in the report, to the view that the whole of Palestine west of Jordan was excluded from Sir Henry McMahon's pledge, and they therefore cannot agree that the McMahon correspondence forms a just basis for a claim that Palestine should be converted into an Arab State.

8. His Majesty's Government are charged as the mandatory authority "to secure the development of self-governing institutions" in Palestine. Apart from this specific obligation, they would regard it as contrary to the whole spirit of the mandate system that the population of Palestine should remain for ever under mandatory tutelage. It is proper that the people of the country should as early as possible enjoy the rights of self-government which are exercised by the people of neighbouring countries. His Majesty's Government are unable at present to foresee the exact constitutional forms which the government in Palestine will eventually take, but their objective is self-government, and they desire to see established ultimately an independent Palestine State. It should be a State in which the two peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authority in government in such a way that the essential interests of each are secured.

9. The establishment of an independent State and the complete relinquishment of mandatory control in Palestine would require such relations between the Arabs and the Jews as would make good government possible. Moreover, the growth of self-governing institutions in Palestine, as in other countries, must be an evolutionary process. A transitional period will be required before independence is achieved, throughout which ultimate responsibility for the Government of the country will be retained by His Majesty's Government as the mandatory authority, while the people of the country are taking an increasing share in the Government, and understanding and co-operation amongst them are growing. It will be the constant endeavour of His Majesty's Government to promote good relations between the Arabs and the Jews.

10. In the light of these considerations His Majesty's Government make the following declaration of their intentions regarding the future government of Palestine:

(1) The objective of His Majesty's Government is the establishment within ten years of an independent Palestine State in such treaty relations with the United Kingdom as will provide satisfactorily for the commercial and strategic requirements of both countries in the future. This proposal for the establishment of the independent State would involve consultation with the Council of the League of Nations with a view to the termination of the mandate.

(2) The independent State should be one in which Arabs and Jews share in government in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests of each community are safeguarded.

(3) The establishment of the independent State will be preceded by a transitional period throughout which His Majesty's Government will retain responsibility for the government of the country. During the transitional period, the people of Palestine will be given an increasing part in the government of their country. Both sections of the population will have an opportunity to participate in the machinery of government, and the process will be carried on whether or not they both avail themselves of it.

(4) As soon as peace and order have been sufficiently restored in Palestine, steps will be taken to carry out this policy of giving the people of Palestine an increasing part in the government of their country, the objective being to place Palestinians in charge of all the Departments of Government, with the assistance of British advisers and subject to the control of the High Commissioner. With this object in view His Majesty's Government will be prepared immediately to arrange that Palestinians shall be placed in charge of certain Departments, with British advisers. The Palestinian heads of Departments will sit on the Executive Council, which advises the High Commissioner. Arab and Jewish representatives will be invited to serve as heads of Department approximately in proportion of their respective populations. The number of Palestinians in charge of Departments will be increased as circumstances permit until all heads of Departments are Palestinians, exercising the administrative and advisory functions which are at present performed by British Officials. When that stage is reached consideration will be given to the question of converting the Executive Council into a Council of Ministers with a consequential change in the status and functions of the Palestinian heads of Departments.

(5) His Majesty's Government make no proposals at this stage regarding the establishment of an elective legislature. Nevertheless, they would regard this as an appropriate constitutional development, and, should public opinion in Palestine hereafter show itself in favour of such a development, they will be prepared, provided that local conditions permit, to establish the necessary machinery.

(6) At the end of five years from the restoration of peace and order, an appropriate body representative of the people of Palestine and of His Majesty's Government will be set up to review

the working of the constitutional arrangements during the transitional period and to consider and make recommendations regarding the constitution of the independent Palestine State.

(7) His Majesty's Government will require to be satisfied that, in the treaty contemplated by sub-paragraph (1) or in the constitution contemplated by sub-paragraph (6), adequate provision has been made for:—

- (a) The security of, and freedom of access to, the holy places, and the protection of the interests and property of the various religious bodies.
- (b) The protection of the different communities in Palestine in accordance with the obligations of His Majesty's Government to both Arabs and Jews and for the special position in Palestine of the Jewish National Home.
- (c) Such requirements to meet the strategic situation as may be regarded as necessary by His Majesty's Government in the light of the circumstances then existing.

His Majesty's Government will also require to be satisfied that the interests of certain foreign countries in Palestine, for the preservation of which they are at present responsible, are adequately safeguarded.

(8) His Majesty's Government will do everything in their power to create conditions which will enable the independent Palestine State to come into being within ten years. If, at the end of ten years, it appears to His Majesty's Government that, contrary to their hope, circumstances require the postponement of the establishment of the independent State, they will consult with representatives of the people of Palestine, the Council of the League of Nations and the neighbouring Arab States before deciding on such a postponement. If His Majesty's Government come to the conclusion that postponement is unavoidable, they will invite the co-operation of these parties in framing plans for the future with a view to achieving the desired objective at the earliest possible date.

11. During the transitional period, steps will be taken to increase the powers and responsibilities of municipal corporations and local councils:

II. IMMIGRATION.

12. Under Article 6 of the Mandate, the Administration of Palestine, "while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced", is required to "facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions". Beyond this, the extent to which Jewish immigration into Palestine is to be permitted is nowhere defined in the mandate. But in the Command Paper of 1922 it was laid down that for the fulfilment of the policy of establishing a Jewish National Home:

“It is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration. This immigration cannot be so grant in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals. It is essential to ensure that the immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole, and that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment.”

In practice, from that date onwards until recent times, the economic absorptive capacity of the country has been treated as the sole limiting factor, and in the letter which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, as Prime Minister, sent to Dr. Weizmann in February 1931 it was laid down as a matter of policy that economic absorptive capacity was the sole criterion. This interpretation has been supported by resolutions of the Permanent Mandates Commission. But His Majesty's Government do not read either the Statement of Policy of 1922 or the letter of 1931 as implying that the mandate requires them, for all time and in all circumstances, to facilitate the immigration of Jews into Palestine subject only to consideration of the country's economic absorptive capacity. Nor do they find anything in the mandate or in subsequent Statements of Policy to support the view that the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine cannot be effected unless immigration is allowed to continue indefinitely. If immigration has an adverse effect on the economic position in the country, it should clearly be restricted; and equally, if it has a seriously damaging effect on the political position in the country, that is a factor that should not be ignored. Although it is not difficult to contend that the large number of Jewish immigrants who have been admitted so far have been absorbed economically, the fear of the Arabs that this influx will continue indefinitely until the Jewish population is in a position to dominate them has produced consequences which are extremely grave for Jews and Arabs alike and for the peace and prosperity of Palestine. The lamentable disturbances of the past three years are only the latest and most sustained manifestation of this intense Arab apprehension. The methods employed by Arab terrorists against fellow-Arabs and Jews alike must receive unqualified condemnation. But it cannot be denied that fear of indefinite Jewish immigration is widespread amongst the Arab population and that this fear has made possible disturbances which have given a serious setback to economic progress, depleted the Palestine exchequer, rendered life and property insecure, and produced a bitterness between the Arab and Jewish populations which is deplorable between citizens of the same country. If in these circumstances immigration is continued up to the economic absorptive capacity of the country, regardless of all other considerations, a fatal enmity between the two peoples will be perpetuated, and the situation in Palestine may become a permanent source of friction amongst all peoples in the Near and Middle East. His Majesty's Government cannot take the view that either their obligations under the mandate, or considerations of common sense and justice, require that they should ignore these circumstances in framing immigration policy.

13. In the view of the Royal Commission, the association of the policy of the Balfour Declaration with the mandate system implied the belief that Arab hostility to the former would sooner or later be overcome. It has been the hope of British Governments ever since the Balfour Declaration was issued that, in time, the Arab population, recognising the advantages to be derived from Jewish settlement and development in Palestine, would become reconciled to the further growth of the Jewish National Home. This hope has not been fulfilled. The alternatives before His Majesty's Government are either (i) to seek to expand the Jewish National Home indefinitely by immigration, against the strongly expressed will of the Arab people of the country; or (ii) to permit further expansion of the Jewish National Home by immigration only if the Arab are prepared to acquiesce in it. The former policy means rule by force. Apart from other considerations, such a policy seems to His Majesty's Government to be contrary to the whole spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as well as to their specific obligations to the Arabs in the Palestine mandate. Moreover, the relations between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine must be based sooner or later on mutual tolerance and goodwill; the peace, security and progress of the Jewish National Home itself require this. Therefore His Majesty's Government, after earnest consideration, and taking into account the extent to which the growth of the Jewish National Home has been facilitated over the last twenty years, have decided that the time has come to adopt in principle the second of the alternatives referred to above.

14. It has been urged that all further Jewish immigration into Palestine should be stopped forthwith. His Majesty's Government cannot accept such a proposal. It would damage the whole of the financial and economic system of Palestine and thus affect adversely the interests of Arabs and Jews alike. Moreover, in the view of His Majesty's Government, abruptly to stop further immigration would be unjust to the Jewish National Home. But, above all, His Majesty's Government are conscious of the present unhappy plight of large numbers of Jews who seek a refuge from certain European countries, and they believe that Palestine can and should make a further contribution to the solution of this pressing world problem. In all these circumstances, they believe that they will be acting consistently with their mandatory obligations to both Arabs and Jews, and in the manner best calculated to serve the interests of the whole people of Palestine, by adopting the following proposals regarding immigration:

(1) Jewish immigration during the next five years will be at a rate which, if economic absorptive capacity permits, will bring the Jewish population up to approximately one-third of the total population of the country. Taking into account the expected natural increase of the Arab and Jewish populations, and the number of illegal Jewish immigrants now in the country, this would allow of the admission, as from the beginning of April this year, of some 75,000 immigrants over the next five years. These immigrants would, subject to the criterion of economic absorptive capacity, be admitted as follows:—

- (a) For each of the next five years, a quota of 10,000 Jewish immigrants will be allowed, on the understanding that a shortage in any one year may be added to the quotas for subsequent years, within the five-year period, if economic absorptive capacity permits.
- (b) In addition, as a contribution towards the solution of the Jewish refugee problem, 25,000 refugees will be admitted as soon as the High Commissioner is satisfied that adequate provision for their maintenance is ensured, special consideration being given to refugee children and dependants.

(2) The existing machinery for ascertaining economic absorptive capacity will be retained, and the High Commissioner will have the ultimate responsibility for deciding the limits of economic capacity. Before each periodic decision is taken, Jewish and Arab representatives will be consulted.

(3) After the period of five years, no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it.

(4) His Majesty's Government are determined to check illegal immigration, and further preventive measures are being adopted. The numbers of any Jewish illegal immigrants who, despite these measures, may succeed in coming into the country and cannot be deported will be deducted from the yearly quotas.

15. His Majesty's Government are satisfied that, when the immigration over five years which is now contemplated has taken place, they will not be justified in facilitating, nor will they be under any obligation to facilitate, the further development of the Jewish National Home by immigration regardless of the wishes of the Arab population.

III. LAND.

16. The Administration of Palestine is required, under Article 6 of the mandate, "while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced" to encourage "close settlement by Jews on the land", and no restriction has been imposed hitherto on the transfer of land from Arabs to Jews. The reports of several expert Commissions have indicated that, owing to the natural growth of the Arab population and the steady sale in recent years of Arab land to Jews, there is now in certain areas no room for further transfers of Arab land, whilst, in some other areas, such transfers of land must be restricted if Arab cultivators are to maintain their existing standard of life and a considerable landless Arab population is not soon to be created. In these circumstances, the High Commissioner will be given general powers to prohibit and regulate transfers of land. These powers will date from the publication of this statement of policy and the High Commissioner will retain them throughout the transitional period.

17. The policy of the Government will be directed towards the development of the land and the improvement, where possible, of methods of cultivation. In the light of such development it will be open to the High Commissioner, should he be satisfied that the "rights and position" of the Arab population will be duly preserved, to review and modify any orders passed relating to the prohibition or restriction of the transfer of land.

18. In framing these proposals, His Majesty's Government have sincerely endeavoured to act in strict accordance with their obligations under the mandate to both the Arabs and the Jews. The vagueness of the phrases employed in some instances to describe these obligations had led to controversy and has made the task of interpretation difficult. His Majesty's Government cannot hope to satisfy the partisans of one party or the other in such controversy as the mandate has aroused. Their purpose is to be just as between the two peoples in Palestine whose destinies in that country have been affected by the great events of recent years, and who, since they live side by side, must learn to practice mutual tolerance, goodwill and co-operation. In looking to the future, His Majesty's Government are not blind to the fact that some events of the past make the task of creating these relations difficult; but they are encouraged by the knowledge that at many times and in many places in Palestine during recent years the Arab and Jewish inhabitants have lived in friendship together. Each community has much to contribute to the welfare of their common land, and each must earnestly desire peace in which to assist in increasing the well-being of the whole people of the country. The responsibility which falls on them, no less than upon His Majesty's Government, to co-operate together to ensure peace is all the more solemn because their country is revered by many millions of Moslems, Jews and Christians throughout the world who pray for peace in Palestine and for the happiness of her people.

Appendix (L)

THE FAISAL-WEIZMANN AGREEMENT

(dated January 3 (?) 1919).

(The source used is a photostat reproduction of the original document.

Versions of the Agreement have appeared in the Press, but none can be described as being both exact and complete. The version given in D. H. Miller's collection of texts (*) is in every respect identical with the original except that it omits the stipulation inscribed by Faisal on the Agreement itself.

The Agreement was in English; Faisal's stipulation was in Arabic, and was inscribed in the space immediately following the last Article. A rough summary in English of Faisal's stipulation, made by T. E. Lawrence at the time, has gained currency—notably in the Times of June 10, 1936, and in the report of the Palestine Royal Commission—as being a reliable rendering of the original. In actual fact, Lawrence's 'translation' is a loose and somewhat misleading paraphrase.

The Agreement is dated January 3, 1919. From the internal evidence in the text of Faisal's stipulation, it seems probable that it was signed at a later date, and in any case not earlier than January 4.)

TEXT OF THE FAISAL-WEIZMANN AGREEMENT.

His Royal Highness the Amir FAISAL, representing and acting on behalf the Arab Kingdom of HEJAZ, and Dr. CHAIM WEIZMANN, representing and acting on behalf of the Zionist Organisation, mindful of the racial kinship and ancient bonds existing between the Arabs and the Jewish people, and realising that the surest means of working out the consummation of their national aspirations is through the closest possible collaboration in the development of the Arab State and Palestine, and being desirous further of confirming the good understanding which exists between them, have agreed upon the following Articles:—

ARTICLE I.

The Arab State and Palestine in their relations and undertakings shall be controlled by the most cordial goodwill and understanding and to this end Arab and Jewish duly accredited agents shall be established and maintained in their respective territories.

* David Hunter Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris, Vol. III.

ARTICLE II.

Immediately following the completion of the deliberations of the Peace Conference, the definite boundaries between the Arab State and Palestine shall be determined by a Commission to be agreed upon by the parties hereto.

ARTICLE III.

In the establishment of the Constitution and Administration of Palestine all such measures shall be adopted as will afford the fullest guarantees for carrying into effect the British Government's Declaration of the 2nd of November, 1917.

ARTICLE IV.

All necessary measures shall be taken to encourage and stimulate immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale, and as quickly as possible to settle Jewish immigrants upon the land through closer settlement and intensive cultivation of the soil. In taking such measures the Arab peasant and tenant farmers shall be protected in their rights, and shall be assisted in forwarding their economic development.

ARTICLE V.

No regulation nor law shall be made prohibiting or interfering in any way with free exercise of religion; and further the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall for ever be allowed. No religious test shall ever be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

ARTICLE VI.

The Mohammedan Holy Places shall be under Mohammedan control.

ARTICLE VII.

The Zionist Organisation proposes to send to Palestine a Commission of experts to make a survey of the economic possibilities of the country, and to report upon the best means for its development. The Zionist Organisation will place the aforementioned Commission at the disposal of the Arab State for the purpose of a survey of the economic possibilities of the Arab State and to report upon the best means for its development. The Zionist Organisation will use its best efforts to assist the Arab State in providing the means for developing the natural resources and economic possibilities thereof.

ARTICLE VIII.

The parties agree to act in complete accord and harmony in all matters embraced herein before the Peace Congress.

ARTICLE IX.

Any matters of dispute which may arise between the contracting parties shall be referred to the British Government for arbitration.

Given under our hand at LONDON, ENGLAND, the THIRD day of JANUARY, ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND NINETEEN.

(Translation from the Arabic original).

Provided the Arabs obtain their independence as demanded in my Memorandum dated the 4th of January, 1919, to the Foreign Office of the Government of Great Britain, I shall concur in the above articles. But if the slightest modification or departure were to be made (so in relation to the demands in the Memorandum) I shall not then be bound by a single word of the present Agreement which shall be deemed void and of no account or validity, and I shall not be answerable in any way whatsoever.

FAISAL IBN HUSAIN (in Arabic)
CHAIM WEIZMANN.

Appendix (M)

RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL SYRIAN CONGRESS ⁽¹⁾

(Damascus, July 2, 1919).

We, the undersigned, members of the General Syrian Congress assembled in Damascus on the 2nd of July, 1919 and composed of delegations from the three zones, namely the southern, eastern and western,⁽²⁾ and furnished with credentials duly authorising us to represent the Moslem, Christian and Jewish inhabitants of our respective districts, have resolved to submit the following as defining the aspirations of the people who have chosen us to place them before the American Section of the Inter-Allied Commission. With the exception of the fifth clause, which was passed by a large majority, the Resolutions which follow were all adopted unanimously:—

(1) We desire full and absolute political independence for Syria within the following boundaries: on the north, the Taurus Range; on the south, a line running from Rafah to al-Jauf and following the Syria-Hejaz border below 'Aqaba; on the east, the boundary formed by the Euphrates and Khabur rivers and a line stretching from some distance east of Abu-Kamal to some distance east of al-Jauf; on the west, the Mediterranean Sea.

(2). We desire the Government of Syria to be a constitutional monarchy based on principles of democratic and broadly decentralised rule which shall safeguard the rights of minorities, and we wish that the Amir Faisal who has striven so nobly for our liberation and enjoyed our full confidence and trust be our King.

(3) In view of the fact that the Arab inhabitants of Syria are not less fitted or gifted than were certain other nations (such as the Bulgarians, Serbs, Greeks and Rumanians) when granted independence, was protest against Article XXII of the Covenant of the League of Nations which relegates us to the standing of insufficiently developed races requiring the tutelage of a mandatory power.

(4) If, for whatever reason that might remain undisclosed to us, the Peace Conference were to ignore this legitimate protest, we shall regard the mandate mentioned in the Covenant of the League of Nations as implying to more than the rendering of assistance in the technical and economic fields without impairment of our absolute independence. We rely on President Wilson's declarations that his object in entering the War was to put an end to acquisitive designs for imperialistic purposes. In our desire that our country should not be made a field for colonisation, and in the belief that the American nation is devoid of colonial ambitions and has no political designs on our country, we resolve to seek assistance in the technical and economic fields from the United States of America on the understanding that the duration of such assistance shall not exceed twenty years.

(1) The text given here is my own rendering of the text published at the time in the Arabic Press.

(2) i.e., the three O.E.T.A.s.

(5) In the event of the United States finding herself unable to accede to our request for assistance, we would seek it from Great Britain, provided always that it will not be allowed to impair the unity and absolute independence of our country and that its duration shall not exceed the period mentioned in the preceeding clause

(6) We do not recognise to the French Government any right to any part of Syria, and we reject all proposals that France should give us assistance or exercise authority in any portion of the country.

(7) We reject the claims of the Zionists for the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in that part of southern Syria which is known as Palestine, and we are opposed to Jewish immigration into any part of the country. We do not acknowledge that they have a title, and we regard their claims as a grave menace to our national, political and economic life. Our Jewish fellow-citizens shall continue to enjoy the rights and to bear the responsibilities which are ours in common.

(8) We desire that there should be no dismemberment of Syria, and no separation of Palestine or the costal region in the west or the Lebanon from the mother country; and we ask that the unity of the country be maintained under any circumstances.

(9) We desire that Iraq should enjoy complete independence, and that no economic barriers be placed between the two countries.

(10) The basic principles proclaimed by President Wilson in condemnation of secret treaties cause us to enter an emphatic protest against any agreement providing for the dismemberment of Syria⁽¹⁾ and against any undertaking envisaging the recognition of Zionism⁽²⁾ in southern Syria; and we ask for the explicit annulment of all such agreements and undertakings.

The lofty principles proclaimed by President Wilson encourage us to believe that the determining consideration in the settlement of our own future will be the real desires of our people; and that we may look to President Wilson and the liberal American nation, who are known for their sincere and generous sympathy with the aspirations of weak nations, for help in the fulfilment of our hopes.

We also fully believe that the Peace Conference will recognise that we would not have risen against Turkish rule under which we enjoyed civic and political privileges, as well as rights of representation, had it not been that the Turks denied us our right to a national existence. We believe that the Peace Conference will meet our desires in full, if only to ensure that our political privileges may not be less, after the sacrifices of life which we have made in the cause of our freedom, than they were before the War.

We desire to be allowed to send a delegation to represent us at the Peace Conference, advocate our claims and secure the fulfilment of our aspirations.

(1) *sc.* The Sykes-Picot Agreement.

(2) *sc.* The Balfour Declaration.

Appendix (N)

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE KING-CRANE COMMISSION WITH REGARD TO SYRIA-PALESTINE AND 'IRAQ.

(August 28, 1919).

1. SYRIA-PALESTINE.

A. We recommend, as most important of all, and in strict harmony with our Instructions, that whatever foreign administration (whether of one or more Powers) is brought into Syria, should come in, not at all as a colonising Power in the old sense of that term, but as a Mandatory under the League of Nations with the clear consciousness that 'the well-being and development of the Syrian people form for it a 'sacred trust'.

- (1) To this end the Mandate should have a limited term, the time of expiration to be determined by the League of Nations, in the light of all the facts as brought out from year to year, in the annual reports of the Mandatory to the League or in other ways.
- (2) The mandatory Administration should have, however, a period and power sufficient to ensure the success of the new state; and especially to make possible carrying through important educational and economic undertakings, essential to secure founding of the State.
- (3) The mandatory Administration should be characterised from the beginning by a strong and vital educational emphasis in clear recognition of the imperative necessity of education for the citizens of a democratic state, and for the development of a sound national spirit. This systematic cultivation of national spirit is particularly required in a country like Syria, which has only recently come to self-consciousness.
- (4) The Mandatory should definitely seek, from the beginning of its trusteeship, to train the Syrian people to independent self-government as rapidly as conditions allow, by setting up all the institutions of a democratic state, and by sharing with them increasingly the work of administration, and so forming gradually an intelligent citizenship, interested unselfishly in the progress of the country, and forming at the same time a large group of disciplined civil servants.
- (5) The period of 'tutelage' should not be unduly prolonged, but independent self-government should be granted as

(1) Text copied from Editor and Publisher (New York), issue dated December 2, 1922.

soon as it can safely be done; remembering that the primary business of governments is not the accomplishment of certain things, but the development of citizens.

- (6) It is peculiarly the duty of the Mandatory in a country like Syria, and in this modern age, to see that complete religious liberty is ensured, both in the constitution and in the practice of the state, and that a jealous care is exercised for the rights of all minorities. Nothing is more vital than this for the enduring success of the new Arab State.
- (7) In the economic development of Syria, a dangerous amount of indebtedness on the part of the new state should be avoided, as well as any entanglements financially with the affairs of the mandatory Power. On the other hand, the legitimate established privileges of foreigners, such as rights to maintain schools, commercial concessions, etc., should be preserved, but subject to review and modification under the authority of the League of Nations in the interest of Syria. The mandatory Power should not take advantage of its position to force a monopolistic control at any point to the detriment either of Syria or of other nations; but it should seek to bring the new State as rapidly as possible to economic independence as well as to political independence.

Whatever is done concerning the further recommendations of the Commission, the fulfilment of at least the conditions now named should be assured, if the Peace Conference and the League of Nations are true to the policy of mandatories already embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations. This should effectively guard the most essential interests of Syria, however the machinery of administration is finally organised. The Damascus Congress betrayed in many ways their intense fear that their country, would become, though under some other name, simply a colonial possession of some other Power. That fear must be completely allayed.

B We recommend, in the second place, that the unity of Syria be preserved, in accordance with the earnest petition of the great majority of the people of Syria.

- (1) The territory concerned is too limited, the population too small, and the economic, geographic, racial and language unity too manifest, to make the setting up of independent States within its boundaries desirable, if such division can possibly be avoided. The country is very largely Arab in language, culture, traditions, and customs.
- (2) This recommendation is in line with important 'general considerations' already urged, and with the principles of the League of Nations, as well as in answer to the desires of the majority of the population concerned.

- (3) The precise boundaries of Syria should be determined by a special commission on boundaries, after the Syrian territory has been in general allotted. The Commissioners believe, however, that the claim of the Damascus Conference to include Cilicia in Syria is not justified, either historically or by commercial or language relations. The line between the Arabic-speaking and the Turkish-speaking populations would quite certainly class Cilicia with Asia Minor, rather than with Syria. Syria, too, has no such need of further seacoast as the large interior sections of Asia Minor.
- (4) In standing thus for the recognition of the unity of Syria, the natural desires of regions like the Lebanon, which have already had a measure of independence, should not be forgotten. It will make for real unity, undoubtedly, to give a large measure of local autonomy, and especially in the case of strongly unified groups. Even the 'Damascus Programme' which presses so earnestly the unity of Syria, itself urges a government 'on broad decentralisation principles.'

Lebanon has achieved a considerable degree of prosperity and autonomy within the Turkish Empire. She certainly should not find her legitimate aspirations less possible within a Syrian national State. On the contrary it may be confidently expected that both her economic and political relations with the rest of Syria would be better if she were a constituent member of the State rather than entirely independent of it.

As a predominantly Christian country, too, Lebanon naturally fears Moslem domination in a unified Syria. But against such domination she would have a four-fold safeguard: her own large autonomy; the presence of a strong mandatory for the considerable period in which the constitution and practice of the new State would be forming; the oversight of the League of Nations, with its insistence upon religious liberty and the rights of minorities; and the certainty that the Arab Government would feel the necessity of such a State, if it were to commend itself to the League of Nations. Moreover, there would be less danger of a reactionary Moslem attitude, if Christians were present in the State in considerable numbers, rather than largely segregated outside the State, as experience of the relations of different religious faiths in India suggests.

As a predominantly Christian country, it is also to be noted that Lebanon would be in a position to exert a stronger and more helpful influence if she were with the Syrian State, feeling its problems and needs, and sharing all its life, instead of outside it, absorbed simply in her own narrow concerns. For the sake of the larger interests, both of Lebanon and of Syria, then, the unity of Syria is to be urged. It is certain that many of the more thoughtful Lebanese themselves hold this view. A similar

statement might be made for Palestine; though, as the Holy Land for Jews and Christians and Moslems alike, its situation is unique, and might more readily justify unique treatment, if such treatment were justified anywhere. This will be discussed more particularly in connexion with the recommendation concerning Zionism.

C. We recommend, in the third place, that Syria be placed under one mandatory Power, as the natural way to secure real and efficient unity.

- (1) To divide the administration of the provinces of Syria among several mandatories, even if existing national unity were recognised; or to attempt a joint mandatory of the whole on the commission plan:—neither of these courses would be naturally suggested as the best way to secure and promote the unity of the new State, or even the general unity of the whole people. It is conceivable that circumstances might drive the Peace Conference to some such form of divided Mandate; but; it is not a solution to be voluntarily chosen, from the point of view of the larger interests of the people, as considerations already urged indicate.
- (2) It is not to be forgotten, either, that, however they are handled politically, the people of Syria are there, forced to get on together in some fashion. They are obliged to live with one another—the Arabs of the East and the people of the coast, the Moslems and the Christians. Will they be helped or hindered, in establishing tolerable and finally cordial relations, by a single mandatory? No doubt the quick mechanical solution of the problem of difficult relations is to split the people up into little independent fragments. And sometimes, undoubtedly, as in the case of the Turks and Armenians, the relations are so intolerable as to make some division imperative and inevitable. But in general, to attempt complete separation only accentuates the differences and increases the antagonism. The whole lesson of the modern social consciousness points to the necessity of understanding 'the other half', as it can be understood only by close and living relations. Granting reasonable local autonomy to reduce friction among groups, a single mandatory ought to form a constant and increasingly effective help to unity of feeling throughout the State, and ought to steadily improve group relations.

The people of Syria, in our hearings, have themselves often insisted that, so far as unpleasant relations have hitherto prevailed among various groups, it has been very largely due to the direct instigation of the Turkish Government. When justice is done impartially to all; when it becomes plain that the aim of the common government is the service of all classes alike, not their exploitation, then can decent human relations be secured—a foundation which could not be obtained by dividing men off from one another in antagonistic groups.

The Commissioners urge, therefore, for the largest future good of all groups and regions alike, the placing of the whole of Syria under a single Mandate.

D. We recommend, in the fourth place, that Amir Faisal be made head of the new united Syrian State.

- (1) This is expressly and unanimously asked for by the representative Damascus Congress in the name of the Syrian people, and there seems to be no reason to doubt that the great majority of the population of Syria sincerely desire to have Amir Faisal as ruler.
- (2) A constitutional monarchy along democratic lines, seems naturally adapted to the Arabs, with their long training under tribal conditions, and with their traditional respect for their Chiefs. They seem to need, more than most people, a king as the personal symbol of the power of the State.
- (3) Amir Faisal has come, too, naturally into his present place of power, and there is no one else who could well replace him. He has the great advantage of being the son of the Sharif of Mecca, and as such honoured throughout the Moslem world. He was one of the prominent Arab leaders who assumed responsibility for the Arab uprising against the Turks, and so shared in the complete deliverance of the Arabic-speaking portions of the Turkish Empire. He was consequently hailed by the Damascus Congress as having merited their full confidence and entire reliance. He was taken up and supported by the British as the most promising candidate for the headship of the new Arab State—an Arab of the Arabs, but with a position of wide appeal through his Sharifian connection, and through his broad sympathies with the best in the Occident. His relations with the Arabs to the east of Syria are friendly, and his kingdom would not be threatened from that side. He undoubtedly does not make so strong an appeal to the Christians of the West Coast, as to the Arabs of the East; but no man can be named who would have a stronger general appeal. He is tolerant and wise, skilful in dealing with men, winning in manner, a man of sincerity, insight and power. Whether he has the full strength needed for his difficult task it is too early to say; but certainly no other Arab leader combines so many elements of power as he, and he will have invaluable help throughout the mandatory period.

The Peace Conference may take genuine satisfaction in the fact that an Arab of such qualities is available for the headship of this new state in the Near East.

E. We recommend, in the fifth place, serious modification of the extreme Zionist programme for Palestine of unlimited immigration of Jews, looking finally to making Palestine distinctly a Jewish State.

- (1) The Commissioners began their study of Zionism with minds predisposed in its favour, but the actual facts in Palestine, coupled with the force of the general principles proclaimed by the Allies and accepted by the Syrians have driven them to the recommendation here made.
- (2) The Commission was abundantly supplied with literature on the Zionist programme by the Zionist Commission to Palestine; heard in conferences much concerning the Zionist colonies and their claims; and personally saw something of what had been accomplished. They found much to approve in the aspirations and plans of the Zionists, and had warm appreciation for the devotion of many of the colonists, and for their success, by modern methods, in overcoming great natural obstacles.
- (3) The Commission recognised also that definite encouragement had been given to the Zionists by the Allies in Mr. Balfour's often-quoted statement, in its approval by other representatives of the Allies. If, however, the strict terms of the Balfour Statement are adhered to—favouring 'the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people', it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine—it can hardly be doubted that the extreme Zionist programme must be greatly modified.

For a national home for the Jewish people is not equivalent to making Palestine into a Jewish State; nor can the erection of such a Jewish State be accomplished without the gravest trespass upon the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine. The fact came out repeatedly in the Commission's conferences with Jewish representatives, that the Zionists looked forward to a practically complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, by various forms of purchase.

In his address of July 4, 1918, President Wilson laid down the following principles as one of the four great 'end for which the associated peoples of the world were fighting': The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.

If that principle is to rule, and so the wishes of Palestine's population are to be decisive as to what is to be done with Palestine, then it is to be remembered that the non-Jewish population of Palestine—nearly nine-tenths of the whole—are emphatically against the entire Zionist programme. The tables show that there was no one thing upon which the population of Palestine were more agreed than upon this. To subject a people so minded to unlimited Jewish immigration, and to steady financial and social pressure to surrender the land, would be a gross violation of the principle just quoted, and of the people's rights, though it kept within the forms of law.

It is to be noted also that the feeling against the Zionist programme is not confined to Palestine, but shared very generally by the people throughout Syria, as our conferences clearly showed. More than seventy-two per cent—1,350 in all—of all the petitions in the whole of Syria were directed against the Zionist programme. Only two requests—those for a united Syria and for independence—had a larger support. This general feeling was duly voiced by the General Syrian Congress in the seventh, eighth and tenth resolutions of the Statement.

The Peace Conference should not shut its eyes to the fact that the anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine and Syria is intense and not lightly to be flouted. No British officer, consulted by the Commissioners, believed that the Zionist programme could be carried out except by force of arms. The officers generally thought that a force not less than 50,000 soldiers would be required even to initiate the programme. That of itself is evidence of a strong sense of the injustice of the Zionist programme, on the part of the non-Jewish populations of Palestine and Syria. Decisions requiring armies to carry out are sometimes necessary, but they are surely not gratuitously to be taken in the interests of serious injustice. For the initial claim, often submitted by Zionist representatives, that they have a 'right' to Palestine, based on an occupation of 2,000 years ago, can hardly be seriously considered.

There is a further consideration that cannot justly be ignored, if the world is to look forward to Palestine becoming a definitely Jewish State, however gradually that may take place. That consideration grows out of the fact that Palestine is the Holy Land for Jews, Christians, and Moslems alike. Millions of Christians and Moslems all over the world are quite as much concerned as the Jews with conditions in Palestine, especially with those conditions which touch upon religious feeling and rights. The relations in these matters in Palestine are most delicate and difficult. With the best possible intentions, it may be doubted whether

the Jews could possibly seem to either Christians or Moslems proper guardians of the holy places, or custodians of the Holy Land as a whole.

The reason is this: The places which are most sacred to christians—those having to do with Jesus—and which are also sacred to Moslems, are not only not sacred to Jews, but abhorrent to them. It is simply impossible, under those circumstances, for Moslems and Christians to feel satisfied to have these places in Jewish hands, or under the custody of Jews. There are still other places about which Moslems must have the same feeling. In fact, from this point of view, the Moslems, just because the sacred places of all three religions are sacred to them, have made very naturally much more satisfactory custodians of the holy places than the Jews could be. It must be believed that the precise meaning in this respect of the complete Jewish occupation of Palestine has not been fully sensed by those who urge the extreme Zionist programme. For it would intensify, with a certainty like fate, the anti-Jewish feeling both in Palestine and in all other portions of the World which look to Palestine as the Holy Land.

In view of all these considerations, and with a deep sense of sympathy for the Jewish cause, the Commissioners feel bound to recommend that only a greatly reduced Zionsist programme be attempted by the Peace Conference, and even that, only very gradually initiated. This would have to mean that Jewish immigration should be definitely limited, and that the project for making Palestine distinctly a Jewish commonwealth should be given up.

There would then be no reason why Palestine could not be included in a united Syrian State, just as other portions of the country, the holy places being cared for by an international and inter-religious commission, somewhat as at present, under the oversight and approval of the Mandatory and of the League of Nations. The Jews, of course, would have representation upon this commission.

The recommendations now made lead naturally to the necessity of recommending what power shall undertake the single Mandate for all Syria.

(1) The considerations already dealt with suggest the qualifications ideally to be desired in the mandatory Power: First of all, it should be freely desired by the people. It should be willing to enter heartily into the spirit of the mandatory system, and its possible gift to the world, and so be willing to withdraw after a reasonable period, and not seek selfishly to exploit the country. It should have a passion for democracy, for the education of the common people and for the development of the national spirit. It needs unlimited sympathy and patience in what is practically certain to be a rather thankless task;

for no Power can go on honestly to face actual conditions (like land-ownership, for example) and seek to correct these conditions, without making many enemies. It should have experience in dealing with less developed peoples, and abundant resources in men and money.

(2) Probably no Power combines all these qualifications, certainly not in equal degree. But there is hardly one of these qualifications that has not been more or less definitely indicated in our conference with the Syrian people and they certainly suggest a new stage in the development of the self-government spirit in the relations of peoples to one another. The Power that undertakes the single Mandate for all Syria, in the spirit of these qualifications, will have the possibility of greatly serving not only Syria but the world, and of exalting at the same time its own national life. For it would be working in direct line with the high aims of the Allies in the War, and give proof that those high aims had not been abandoned. And that would mean very much just now, in enabling the nations to keep their faith in one another and in their highest ideals.

(3) The Resolutions of the Peace Conference of January 30, 1919, quoted in our instructions, expressly state for regions to be 'completely severed from the Turkish Empire', that 'the wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory Power'. Our survey left no room for doubt of the choice of the majority of the Syrian people. Although it was not known whether America would take a Mandate at all; and although the Commission could not only give no assurances upon that point, but had rather to discourage expectation, nevertheless, upon the face of the returns, America was the first choice of 1,152 of the petitions presented—more than sixty per cent—while no other Power had as much as fifteen per cent for first choice.

And the conference showed that the people knew the grounds upon which they registered their choice for America. They declared that their choice was due to knowledge of America's record; the unselfish aims with which she had come into the War; the faith in her felt by multitudes of Syrians who had been in America; the spirit revealed in American educational institutions in Syria, especially the College ⁽¹⁾ in Bairut, with its well-known and constant encouragement of Syrian national sentiment; their belief that America had no territorial or colonial ambitions, and would willingly withdraw when the Syrian State was well established as her treatment both of Cuba and the Philippines seemed to them to illustrate; her genuinely democratic spirit; and her ample resources.

From the point of view of the desires of the 'people concerned', the Mandate should clearly go to America.

(4) From the point of view of qualifications, too, already stated as needed in the Mandatory for Syria, America, as first choice of the people, probably need not fear careful testing, point by point, by the standard involved in our discussion of qualifications; though she has much less experience in such work than Great Britain, and is likely

(1) The Syrian Protestante College founded in 1866, see Chapter III, Section 4, *supra*.

to show less patience; and though her definite connexions with Syria have been less numerous and close than those of France. She would have at least the great qualification of fervent belief in the new mandatory system of the League of Nations, as indicating the proper relations which a strong nation should take toward a weaker one. And, though she would undertake the Mandate with reluctance, she could probably be brought to see how logically the taking of such responsibility follows from the purposes with which she entered the War, and from her advocacy of the League of Nations.

(5) There is a further consideration that America could probably come into the Syrian situation, in the beginning at least, with less friction than any other Power. The great majority of Syrian people, as has been seen, favour her coming, rather than that of any other Power. Both the British and the French would find it easier to yield their respective claims to America than to each other. She would have no rival imperial interests to press. She would have abundant resources for the development of the sound prosperity of Syria; and this would inevitably benefit in a secondary way the nations which have had closest connexion with Syria, and so help to keep relations among the Allies cordial. No other Power probably would be more welcome as a neighbour to the British with their large interests in Egypt, Arabia and Iraq; or to the Arabs and Syrians in these regions; or to the French with their long-established and many-sided interests in Bairut and the Lebanon.

(6) The objections to recommending at once a single American Mandate for all Syria are: First of all, that it is not certain that the American people would be willing to take the Mandate; that it is not certain that the British or French would be willing to withdraw, and would cordially welcome America coming, a situation which might prove steadily harassing to an American administration; that the vague but large encouragement given to the Zionist aims might prove particularly embarrassing to America, on account of her large influential Jewish population; and that; if America were to take any mandate at all, and were to take but one mandate, it is probable that an Asia Minor Mandate would be more natural and important. For there is a task there of such peculiar and world-wide significance as to appeal to the best in America, and demand the utmost from her, and as certainly to justify her in breaking with her established policy concerning mixing in the affairs of the eastern hemisphere. The Commissioners believe, moreover, that no other Power could come into Asia Minor, with hands so free to give impartial justice to all the peoples concerned.

To these objections, as a whole, it is to be said that they are all of such a kind that they may resolve themselves; and that they only form the sort of obstacles that must be expected in so large and significant an undertaking. In any case they do not relieve the Commissioners from the duty of recommending the course, and the one for which the whole situation calls.

The Commissioners, therefore, recommend, as involved in the logic of the facts, that the United States of America be asked to undertake the single Mandate for all Syria.

If for any reason the mandate for Syria is not given to America, then the Commissioners recommend, in harmony with the express request of the majority of the Syrian people, that the mandate be given to Great Britain. The tables show that there were 1,073 petitions in all Syria for Great Britain as mandatory, if America did not take the Mandate. This is very greatly in excess of any similar expression for the French.

On the contrary—for whatever reason—more than sixty per cent of all the petitions presented to the Commission directly and strongly protested against French mandate. Without going into discussion of the reasons for this situation, the Commissioners are reluctantly compelled to believe that this situation itself makes it impossible to recommend a single French Mandate for all Syria.

The feeling of the Arabs of the East is particularly strong against the French. And there is grave reason to believe that the attempt to enforce a French Mandate would precipitate war between the Arabs and the French, and force upon Great Britain a dangerous alternative. The Commissioners may perhaps be allowed to say that this conclusion is contrary to their own earlier hope, that—because of France's long and intimate relations with Syria, because of her unprecedented sacrifices in the War, and because the British Empire seemed certain to receive far greater accessions of territory from the War—it might seem possible to recommend that France be given the entire Mandate for Syria. But the longer the Commission remained in Syria, the more clear it became that that course could not be taken.

The Commissioners recommend, therefore, if America cannot take the mandate for all Syria, that it be given to Great Britain, because of the choice of the people concerned; because she is already on the ground and with much of the necessary work in hand; because of her trained administrators; because of her long and generally successful experience in dealing with less developed peoples; and because she has so many of the qualifications needed in a mandatory Power as we have already considered them.

We should hardly be doing justice, however, to our sense of responsibility to the Syrian people, if we did not frankly add some at least of the reasons and misgivings, variously expressed and implied in our conferences, which led to the preference for an American Mandate over a British Mandate. The people repeatedly showed honest fear that in British hands the mandatory power would become simply a colonising power of the old kind; that Great Britain would find it difficult to give up the colonial theory, especially in case of a people thought inferior; that she would favour a civil service and pension budget too expensive for a poor people; that the interests of Syria would be subordinated to the supposed needs of the Empire; that there would be, after all, too much exploitation of the country for Britain's benefit; that she would never be ready to withdraw and give the country real independence; that she did not really believe in universal education, and would not provide adequately for it; and that she already had more territory in her possession—in spite of her fine colonial record—than was good either for herself or for the world.

These misgivings of the Syrian people unquestionably largely explain their demand for 'absolute independence', for a period of 'assistance' of only twenty years, their protest against Article XXII of the Covenant of the League of Nations, etc. They all mean that whatever Power the Peace Conference shall send into Syria, should go in as a true mandatory under the League of Nations, and for a limited term. Any thing else would be a betrayal of the Syrian people.

It needs to be emphasised, too, that under a true mandatory for Syria, all the legitimate interests of all the nations in Syria would be safeguarded. In particular, there is no reason why any tie that France had had with Syria in the past should be severed or even weakened under the control of another mandatory Power, or in an independent Syria.

There remains only to be added that, if France feels as intensely concerning her present claims in Syria as to threaten all cordial relations among the Allies, it is, of course, possible to give her a Mandate over the Lebanon (not enlarged) separated from the rest of Syria, as is desired by considerable groups in that region. For reasons already given, the Commissioners cannot recommend this course, but it is a possible arrangement.

II. IRAQ ⁽¹⁾

In view of the Resolutions, passed by the Peace Conference on January 30, 1919, and of the Anglo-French Declaration of November 7, 1918—on the eve of the Armistice—both of which documents class Syria and Iraq together to be treated in the same way, and make to them the same promises and assurances, the Commissioners recommend that the Peace Conference adopt for Iraq a policy in general parallel to that recommended for Syria, in order that the Anglo-French Declaration may not become another 'scrap of paper'.

1. We accordingly recommend, as most important of all, and in strict harmony with our instructions, that whatever foreign administration is brought into Iraq should come into Iraq not at all as a colonising power in the old sense of that term, but as a mandatory under the League of Nations, with clear consciousness that the 'well-being and development' of the people form for it a sacred trust. To this end the Mandate should have a limited term, the time of expiration to be determined by the League of Nations, in the light of all the facts as brought out from year to year, whether in the annual reports of the mandatory to the League or in other ways.

The entire text of the first recommendation for Syria, with its subordinate recommendations, applies point to point to Iraq as truly as to Syria.

(1) For the sake of uniformity, I have replaced 'Mesopotamia' by Iraq throughout, and made certain orthographical changes in proper names.

If the peace conference, the League of Nations, and the appointed mandatory Power loyally carry out the policy of mandatories embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the most essential interests of Iraq would be fully safeguarded—but only so.

2. We recommend, in the second place, that the unity of Iraq be preserved; the precise boundaries to be determined by a special commission on boundaries, after the Mandate has been assigned. It should be linked up with Iraq. The wisdom of a united country needs no argument in the case of Iraq.

3. We recommend, in the third place, that Iraq be placed under one mandatory Power, as the natural way to secure real and efficient unity. The economic, political, social and educational development of the people all call for such a unified mandate. Only waste, confusion, and injury to the people's interests could come from attempting a division and 'spheres of influence' on the part of several nations. But this implies that the mandatory Power shall not itself be an exploiting Power, but shall sacredly guard the people's rights.

4. Since it is plainly desirable that there be general harmony in the political and economic institutions and arrangements of Iraq and Syria; and since the people themselves should have chief voice in determining the form of government under which they shall live, we recommend that the Government of Iraq, in harmony with the apparent desires of its people, be a Constitutional Monarchy; such as is proposed for Syria; and that the people of Iraq be given opportunity to indicate their choice of a Monarch, the choice to be reviewed and confirmed by the League of Nations. It may be fairly assumed that the 1,278 petitions from Syrians for the independence of Iraq—68.5 per cent of the total number received—reflect the feeling in Iraq itself; and such contact as we have been able to secure with Iraqis confirms the assumption, and leads to the belief that the programme, presented at Aleppo by representative Iraqis, headed by Ja'far Pasha, Military Governor of the Aleppo District and practically parallel to the Damascus Programme, would be generally supported by the Iraqi people. Whether this support extends to each item in the programme alike, and so to the naming of a king from the sons of the King of the Hejaz, we have not sufficient data to determine, and so have recommended that a plebiscite be taken upon that point, although there is British evidence that many Iraqis have expressed themselves in favour of one of the sons of the king of the Hejaz as Amir.

5. The Iraqi Programme expresses its choice of America as mandatory, and with no second choice. Undoubtedly there has been a good deal of feeling in Iraq against Great Britain, and the petitions specifically charge the British authorities in Iraq with considerable interference with freedom of opinion, of expression, and of travel—much of which might be justified in time of military occupation. But feeling so stirred might naturally breed unwillingness to express desire for Great Britain as mandatory.

On the other hand, the material in the pamphlet called 'Copies and Translations of Declarations and other Documents relating to

Self-Determination in Iraq' was called out by an attempt on the part of the British Government in Iraq to secure the opinions of leading men of all groups concerning 'self-determination'. This material, just because reported directly to British officials, is doubtless somewhat more favourable to the British than it would otherwise be; but it gives unquestionably good evidence of much opinion likely to choose a British Mandate. And after all, the range of choice of a mandatory, of sufficient power and experience and of essential justice, is decidedly limited, and it is by no means improbable that if the Iraqis were confronted by a refusal of America to take a Mandate for Iraq, they would make Great Britain at least second choice, as the majority of the Syrians did. There is supplementary evidence also upon this point.

Now it seems so unlikely that America could or would take a Mandate for Iraq, in addition to the possible considerations of Syria and Asia Minor, that the Commissioners recommend that the Peace Conference assign the Mandate for Iraq to Great Britain: because of the general reasons already given for recommending her as mandatory in Syria, if America does not go in there; because she is probably best of all fitted for the particular task involved, in view of her long relations with Arabs; in recognition of the sacrifices made by her in delivering Iraq from the Turks, though with no acknowledgment of right of conquest, as her own statements expressly disclaim; because of the special interests she naturally has in Iraq on account of its nearness to India and its close connexions with Arabia; and because of work already done in the territory.

These reasons make it probable that the largest interests of the people of Iraq as a whole will be best served by a British Mandate, in spite of the fact that from the point of view of world-interests, in the prevention of jealousy, suspicion, and fear of domination by a single Power, it were better for both Britain and the world that no further territory anywhere be added to the British Empire. A British Mandate, however, will have the decided advantage of tending to promote economic and educational unity throughout Iraq and Syria, whether Syria be under Great Britain or America, and so will reflect more fully than ever before the close relations, in language customs, and trade between these parts of the former Turkish Empire

In a country so rich as Iraq in agricultural possibilities, in oil, and in other resources, with best intentions, there will inevitably be danger of exploitation and monopolistic control by the Mandatory Power, through making British interests supreme, and especially through large Indian immigration. This danger will need increasingly and most honestly to be guarded against. The Iraqis feel very strongly the menace particularly of Indian immigration, even though that immigration should be confined to Moslems. They dread the admixture of another people of entirely different race and customs, as threatening their Arabic civilisation.

Respectfully submitted,

HENRY C. KING,
CHARLES R. CRANE.

Appendix (O)

THE CHURCHILL MEMORANDUM,

(June 3, 1922.)

(British White Paper, Cmd. 1700)

Preamble—The Secretary of State for the Colonies has given renewed consideration to the existing political situation in Palestine with a very earnest desire to arrive at a settlement of the outstanding questions which have given rise to uncertainty and unrest among certain sections of the population. After consultation with the High Commissioner for Palestine the following statement has been drawn up. It summarises the essential parts of the correspondence that has already taken place between the Secretary of State and a Delegation from the Moslem-Christian Society of Palestine, which has been for some time in England, and it states the further conclusions which have since been reached.

The tension which has prevailed from time to time in Palestine is mainly due to apprehensions, which are entertained both by sections of the Arab and of the Jewish population. These apprehensions, so far as the Arabs are concerned, are partly based upon the exaggerated interpretations of the meaning of the Declaration favouring the establishment of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, made on behalf of His Majesty's Government on November 2, 1917. Unauthorised statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that Palestine is to become "as Jewish as England is English." His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated, as appears to be feared by the Arab Delegation, the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine. In this connection it has been observed with satisfaction that at the meeting of the Zionist Congress, the supreme governing body of the Zionist Organisation, held in Carlsbad in September, 1921, a resolution was passed expressing as the official statement of Zionist aims "the determination of the Jewish people to live with the Arab people on terms of unity and mutual respect, and together with them to make the common home into a flourishing community, the up-building of which may assure to each of its peoples an undisturbed national development."

It is also necessary to point out that the Zionist Commission in Palestine, now termed the Palestine Zionist Executive, has not desired to possess, and does not possess, any share in the general administration of the country. Nor does the special position assigned to the Zionist Organisation in Article 4 of the Draft Mandate for

Palestine imply any such functions. That special position relates to the measures to be taken in Palestine affecting the Jewish population, and contemplates that the organisation may assist in the general development of the country, but does not entitle it to share in any degree in its Government.

Further, it is contemplated that the status of all citizens of Palestine in the eyes of the law shall be Palestinian, and it has never been intended that they, or any section of them, should possess any other juridical status.

So far as the Jewish population of Palestine are concerned, it appears that some among them are apprehensive that His Majesty's Government may depart from the policy embodied in the Declaration of 1917. It is necessary, therefore, once more to affirm that these fears are unfounded, and that that Declaration, re-affirmed by the Conference of the Principal Allied Powers at San Remo and again in the Treaty of Sèvres, is not susceptible of change.

During the last two or three generations the Jews have re-created in Palestine a community, now numbering 80,000, of whom about one-fourth are farmers or workers on the land. This community has its own political organs; an elected assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns; elected councils in the towns; and an organisation for the control of its schools. It has its elected Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical Council for the direction of its religious affairs. Its business is conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular language, and a Hebrew press serves its needs. It has its distinctive intellectual life and displays considerable economic activity. This community, then, with its town and country population, its political, religious and social organisations, its own language, its own customs, its own life, has in fact "national" characteristics. When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognised to rest upon ancient historic connection.

This, then, is the interpretation which His Majesty's Government place upon the Declaration of 1917, and, so understood, the Secretary of State is of opinion that it does not contain or imply anything which need cause either alarm to the Arab population of Palestine or disappointment to the Jews.

For the fulfilment of this policy it is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration. This immigration cannot be so great in volume as to

exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals. It is essential to ensure that the immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole, and that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment. Hitherto the immigration has fulfilled these conditions. The number of immigrants since the British occupation has been about 25,000.

It is necessary also to ensure that persons who are politically undesirable are excluded from Palestine, and every precaution has been and will be taken by the Administration to that end.

It is intended that a special committee should be established in Palestine, consisting entirely of members of the new Legislation Council elected by the people, to confer with the Administration upon matters relating to the regulation of immigration. Should any difference of opinion arise between this committee and the Administration, the matter will be referred to His Majesty's Government, who will give it special consideration. In addition, under Article 81 of the draft Palestine Order in Council, any religious community or considerable section of the population of Palestine will have a general right to appeal, through the High Commissioner and the Secretary of State, to the League of Nations on any matter on which they may consider that the terms of the Mandate are not fulfilled by the Government of Palestine.

With reference to the Constitution which it is now intended to establish in Palestine, the draft of which has already been published, it is desirable to make certain points clear. In the first place it is not the case, as has been represented by the Arab Delegation, that during the war His Majesty's Government gave an undertaking that an independent national government should at once be established in Palestine. This representation mainly rests upon a letter dated October 24, 1915, from Sir Henry MacMahon, then His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt, to the Sherif of Mecca, now King Hussein of the Kingdom of the Hejaz. That letter is quoted as conveying the promise to the Sherif of Mecca to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories proposed by him. But this promise was given subject to a reservation made in the same letter which excluded from its scope, among other territories, the portions of Syria lying to the west of the district of Damascus. This reservation has always been regarded by His Majesty's Government as covering the vilayet of Beirut and the independent Sunjak of Jerusalem. The whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was thus excluded from Sir H. McMahon's pledge.

Nevertheless, it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to foster the establishment of a full measure of self-government in Palestine. But they are of opinion that, in the special circumstances of that country, this should be accomplished by gradual stages and not suddenly. The first step was taken when, on the institution of a civil Administration, the nominated Advisory Council, which now exists, was established. It was stated at the time by the High Commissioner that this was the first step in the development of self-governing institutions, and it is now proposed to take a second step

by the establishment of a Legislative Council containing a large proportion of members elected on a wide franchise. It was proposed in the published draft that three of the members of this Council should be non-official persons nominated by the High Commissioner, but representations having been made in opposition to this provision, based on cogent considerations, the Secretary of State is prepared to omit it. The Legislative Council would then consist of the High Commissioner as President and twelve elected and ten official members. The Secretary of State is of opinion that before a further measure of self-government is extended to Palestine and the Assembly placed in control over the Executive, it would be wise to allow some time to elapse. During this period the institutions of the country will have become well established; its financial credit will be based on firm foundations, and the Palestinian officials will have been enabled to gain experience of sound methods of government. After a few years the situation will again be reviewed, and if the experience of the working of the Constitution now to be established so warranted, a larger share of authority would then be extended to the elected representatives of the people.

The Secretary of State would point out that already the present Administration has transferred to a Supreme Council elected by the Moslem community of Palestine the entire control of Moslem religious endowments (Wakfs), and of the Moslem religious courts. To this Council the Administration has also voluntarily restored considerable revenues derived from ancient endowments which had been sequestrated by the Turkish Government. The Education Department is also advised by a committee representative of all sections of the population, and the Department of Commerce and Industry has the benefit of the co-operation of the Chambers of Commerce which have been established in the principal centres. It is the intention of the Administration to associate in an increased degree similar representative committees with the various Departments of the Government.

The Secretary of State believes that a policy upon these lines, coupled with the maintenance of the fullest religious liberty in Palestine and with scrupulous regard for the rights of each community with reference to its Holy Places, cannot but commend itself to the various sections of the population, and that upon this basis may be built up that spirit of cooperation upon which the future progress and prosperity of the Holy Land must largely depend.

THE JEWISH AND ARAB REPLIES.

The British White Paper in which this statement of Policy is published also contains the replies of the Jews and Arabs to it.

The Jewish reply, in the form of a letter from Dr. Weizmann to the Colonial Office, transmitted the following resolution:

“The Execution of the Zionist Organisation, having taken note of the statement relative to British policy in Palestine, transmitted

to them by the Colonial Office under date June 3rd, 1922, assure His Majesty's Government that the activities of the Zionist Organisation will be conducted in conformity with the policy therein set forth."

The Arab reply, on the other hand, declined to concur in the British Statement. It pointed out that the British document contained some mis-statements of fact to which those with local knowledge could not subscribe, notably that the Zionist did not "possess any share in the general administration of the country." It went on to claim that the Arabs of Palestine, who formed 93 per cent. of the population, had as much right as had the Jews to be "confirmed in their national home." After reiterating that the McMahon promise included independence for Palestine, the Arab reply concluded by pointing out that the Mandatory was wrong in thinking that its policy was acceptable to all sections of the population. On the contrary, it caused discontent among 93 per cent. of the whole, who feared the Zionists, who "enter Palestine by the might of England against the will of the people who are convinced that they have come to strangle them. Nature does not allow the creation of a spirit of co-operation between two peoples so different. . . The fact is that His Majesty's Government has placed itself in the position of a partisan in Palestine of a certain policy which the Arab cannot accept because it means his extinction sooner or later."

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